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Abstract
We consider the Arrow-Debreu exchange market model where agents’ demands satisfy the weak
gross substitutes (WGS) property. This is a well-studied property, in particular, it gives a sufficient
condition for the convergence of the classical taˆtonnement dynamics. In this paper, we present a simple
auction algorithm that obtains an approximate market equilibrium for WGS demands. Such auction
algorithms have been previously known for restricted classes of WGS demands only. As an application
of our technique, we obtain an efficient algorithm to find an approximate spending-restricted market
equilibrium for WGS demands, a model that has been recently introduced as a continuous relaxation
of the Nash social welfare (NSW) problem. This leads to a polynomial-time constant factor approx-
imation algorithm for NSW with budget additive separable piecewise linear utility functions; only a
pseudopolynomial approximation algorithm was known for this setting previously.
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1 Introduction
Market equilibrium is a fundamental and well-established notion to analyze and predict the out-
comes of strategic interaction in large markets. In the classic Arrow-Debreu exchange market
model, a set of agents arrive at the market with initial endowments of divisible goods. A market
equilibrium comprises a set of prices and allocations of goods to the agents such that each agent
spends their income from selling their initial endowment on a bundle that maximizes their utility,
and the market clears: demand of each good meets its supply. This model was first studied by Wal-
ras in 1874 [59], who also introduced a natural market dynamics, called the taˆtonnement process.
A continuous version of the process was shown to converge to an equilibrium if the utility functions
satisfy the weak gross substitutability (WGS) property, namely, that if the prices of some goods
increase and the others remain unchanged, then the demand for the latter goods may not decrease
(see Arrow, Block, and Hurwitz [3], Arrow and Hurwitz [6], and references therein). However, Scarf
[57] showed, using an example of Leontief utilities, that taˆtonnement may not always converge to
an equilibrium. We refer the reader to [52, Chapter 17] on the stability of the taˆtonnement process.
The polynomial-time computability of market equilibrium for WGS utilities was first established
by Codenotti, Pemmaraju, and Varadarajan [25]. Later, a simple ascending-price algorithm using
global demand queries was given by Bei, Garg, and Hoefer [9]. Further, Codenotti, McCune, and
Varadarajan [23] have shown that a simple discrete variant of the taˆtonnement algorithm converges
to an approximate equilibrium (see also [55, Section 6.3]). This was followed by a number of papers
providing taˆtonnement algorithms for various classes of utility functions and restricted models,
some of them substantially weakening the need for central coordination among agents, see e.g.,
[7, 19, 20, 27, 37]. However, most of these algorithms still rely on global demand queries, and
hence they are less plausible to be implemented in real economies. In a sense, they require a central
authority (responsible for updating prices) to have some general information about the preferences
of all agents in the market.
Auction algorithms In this paper, we focus on an even simpler subclass of taˆtonnement-type
algorithms, called auction algorithms. Whereas prices in taˆtonnement may increase as well as
decrease, in auctions prices may only go up. Auction algorithms are appealing due to their sim-
plicity and distributed nature: under simple “ground rules” the agents outbid each other and in
the process converge to an approximate market equilibrium. Unlike the above mentioned works,
these algorithms do not require a central authority and need only minimal coordination between
the agents. Further, these algorithmic frameworks are quite robust and easily allow for various
extensions and generalizations. For exchange market models, the first such algorithm was estab-
lished for linear utilities by Garg and Kapoor [42] (see also [55, Section 5.12]). The algorithm was
later improved [43] and generalized to separable concave gross substitute utility functions [45], to
a subclass of non-separable gross-substitutes called uniformly separable [44], and to a production
model with linear production constraints and linear utilities [48].
There is a long history of auction algorithms both in the optimization and in the economics
literature. Bertsekas [11, 12] introduced auction algorithms for assignment and transportation prob-
lems. Closely related algorithms were introduced for markets with indivisible goods, by Kelso and
Crawford [50], and Demange, Gale, and Sotomayor [30]. We will discuss markets with indivisible
goods later in this section.
Our contributions Our first main contribution is an auction algorithm that computes an approx-
imate market equilibrium for arbitrary WGS utilities, given via demand oracles, settling an open
question from [44]. This result shows that for WGS utilities, this restricted class of taˆtonnement
algorithms already suffices to obtain a market equilibrium. The result affirms the natural intuition
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that the WGS property is geared for auction algorithms. A main invariant in auction algorithms
is that at every price increase, the agents will still hold on to the goods they have purchased previ-
ously at the lower prices. This property is almost identical to the definition of the WGS property;
nevertheless, making an auction algorithm work for general WGS utilities requires some careful
technical ideas. The previously mentioned auction algorithms operate with two prices for each
good, a lower price pj and a higher price (1 + ǫ)pj. For linear utilities, [42] maintains that all
purchases are maximum bang-per-buck goods with respect to the lower or higher price. This idea
can be extended to separable [43] and to uniformly separable utilities [45], but does not work if the
utilities are genuinely non-separable. For this general case, our main technical idea is to maintain
subsets of optimal bundles for each agent with respect to some individual prices. These individual
prices can be different for the agents but fall between the higher and lower prices p and (1 + ǫ)p.
This results in the first “agent-driven” algorithm for the entire range of WGS utilities that
avoids the need of a central authority, where each agent uses only their own black-box oracle
FindNewPrices (Section 3), which depends only on their own preference to outbid another agent
on a particular good. The process of outbidding another agent can also be implemented in an
uncoordinated manner. Overall, this lessens the level of coordination needed in the market, and
thus raises the level of plausibility of the algorithm to be run in real economies.
We also study auction algorithms for multiple models of Fisher markets. These are a special
case of exchange markets where every agent arrives with a fixed budget instead of an endowment of
goods. A particular motivation comes from recent study of the Nash social welfare (NSW) problem:
allocating indivisible goods to agents so that the geometric mean of their utilities is maximized. This
problem is NP-hard already for simple classes of utilities, and there has been a considerable recent
literature on approximation algorithms for the problem and its extensions. Cole and Gkatzelis
[28] gave the first constant-factor approximation for linear utilities, followed by further work with
stronger guarantees as well as extensions for other utility classes [1, 2, 8, 17, 26, 28, 38, 39].
The algorithm in [28] and many others start by studying a continuous relaxation corresponding
to a specific market equilibrium problem with spending restrictions: namely, if the price pi of good
i is above 1, then the amount sold of a good i is decreased to 1/pi from the initial total amount of
1. Whereas a market equilibrium with spending restrictions can be obtained via a convex program
for linear utilities [26], it becomes challenging to find for more general utilities: currently known
cases are budget additive valuations [38] and separable piecewise-linear concave (SPLC) utility
functions [2]. The set of equilibria in the former case turned out not to be even convex.
In this paper, we show that auction algorithms are particularly well-suited for spending re-
stricted market equilibrium computation: once the price of a good goes above one, we can naturally
decrease the total available amount of these goods within the auction framework. This enables us
to find simple approximation algorithms for spending restricted equilibria for a broad class of util-
ity functions, including the models above as well as their common generalization: budget additive
SPLC. A surprising feature here is that we do not even have to make the standard non-satiation
assumption. Moreover, our algorithm can be used to obtain a constant-factor approximation for
maximizing NSW in polynomial-time when agents have budget additive SPLC utilities and goods
come in multiple copies. The previous algorithm for this setting in [17] runs in pseudopolynomial
time. We expect that our algorithm for finding approximate spending restricted equilibria will find
more applications for the NSW and other related problems.
Markets with indivisible goods Auction algorithms have been widely studied in the context of
markets with indivisible goods. Equilibria may not always exists in markets with indivisible goods.
The class of (discrete) gross substitute utilities was introduced by Kelso and Crawford [50]. For this
class, an equilibrium is guaranteed to exist, and an approximate equilibrium can be efficiently found
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via a simple auction algorithm, extending [29]. It turned out that the discrete gross substitutes
property is essentially a necessary and sufficient condition for the auction algorithm to work. We
refer the reader to the survey by Paes Leme [51] on the role of gross substitute utilities in markets
with indivisible goods, and their connections to discrete convex analysis.
Whereas the definitions of discrete gross substitutes and continuous WGS utilities are very
similar, there does not appear to be a direct connection between these notions. The main difference
is in the utility concepts: for indivisible markets, the standard model is to maximize the valuation
minus the price of the set at given prices, whereas the standard divisible market models operate with
fiat money: the prices appear via the budget constraints but not in the utility value. Still, our result
can be interpreted as the continuous analogue of the strong link between auction algorithms and
the gross substitutes property for markets with indivisible goods: we show that auction algorithms
are applicable for the entire class of WGS utilities for markets with divisible goods. We suspect
that the converse should also be true, namely, that the applicability of auction algorithms should
be limited to WGS utilities. In contrast, taˆtonnement algorithms have been successfully applied
beyond the WGS class, see e.g. [19, 20, 37].
Let us also comment on the oracle model we use. Typically, (continuous) WGS utilities in the
literature are given in an explicit form such as CES or Cobb-Douglas utilities. This is in contrast
with the discrete WGS setting, where the common model is via a value or demand oracle [51],
since direct preference elicitation, that is, the explicit description of the valuation function would
be exponential. The class of continuous WGS functions also appears to be very rich and expressive,
and hence an oracle approach seems more appropriate to devise algorithms for this class. In our
model, the agent preferences are represented via a demand oracle (Definition 2.3).
The auction algorithm relies on the more powerful FindNewPrices subroutine, which can be seen
as a strengthening of the demand oracle, incorporating a mechanism for price increments. There are
various ways to implement such a subroutine: in Section 3.2 we use a simple iterative application
of the demand oracle for the case of bounded price elasticities; in Section 6 we use a convex
programming approach for Gale demand systems; and in Section 7.1 we devise a combinatorial
algorithm for budget-additive SPLC utilities.
Further related work The existence of a market equilibrium is always guaranteed under some
mild assumptions, as shown by Arrow and Debreu [4], using Kakutani’s fixed point theorem. The
computational aspects of finding a market equilibrium have been extensively studied in the theo-
retical computer science community over the last two decades, establishing hardness results as well
as polynomial-time algorithms for certain cases. We refer the reader to [14, 18, 24, 31, 34, 40, 47,
58, 61, 41] for an overview of the literature.
The other famous dynamics to study market equilibrium is proportional response where in each
round agents bid on goods in proportional to the utility they receive from them in the previous
round. The goods are then allocated in proportion of the agents’ bids. It has been shown that
proportional response converges to market equilibrium in a variety of Fisher markets [13, 21, 22, 62],
and some special cases of exchange markets [16, 15, 60].
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 defines the exchange market model and
provides examples of WGS demand systems. Section 3 presents the auction algorithm for exchange
markets. Section 4 defines the Fisher market model, spending restricted equilibrium, Gale demand
systems, and their connections with the NSW problem. Section 5 gives a modification of the
algorithm for Fisher markets with spending restrictions. Section 6 implements the key subroutine
of the algorithm for Gale demand systems. Finally, Section 7 considers budget-additive SPLC
utility functions and presents a constant-factor approximation algorithm for the NSW problem.
3
2 Models and concepts
2.1 The exchange market model
Let us use the notation [k] = {1, 2, . . . , k}, and let 1k denote the k dimensional vector with all
entries 1. We will simply use 1 if the dimension is clear from the context. We consider a market
with a set of agents A = [n] and divisible goods G = [m]. Each agent i ∈ [n] arrives at the market
with an initial endowment of goods e(i) ∈ Rm+ . Thus, the total amount of each good j ∈ [m] is ej
where e =
∑n
i=1 e
(i); w.l.o.g. ej > 0. Given a non-negative price vector p ∈ R
m
+ , the budget of
agent i at prices p is defined as bi = bi(p) = p
⊤e(i). It follows that p⊤e =
∑
i p
⊤e(i) =
∑
i bi.
We now define the market equilibrium using demand systems. A bundle x is a non-negative
vector x ∈ Rm+ . A demand system is a function D : R
m+1
+ → 2
R
m
+ ; D(p, b) denotes the set of
preferred bundles of an agent at prices p and budget b. Bundles in D(p, b) are called the optimal or
demand bundles at prices p and budget b. This corresponds to the standard concept of a demand
function, except that we do not assume the uniqueness of a preferred bundle. For example, in case
of a linear utility function u(x) =
∑
j∈G vjxj, D(p, b) includes all fractional assignment of goods
maximizing vj/pj with a total price b. If |D(p, b)| = 1 for all (p, b) ∈ R
m+1 we say that the demand
system is simple, and we will also use D(p, b) to denote this single bundle.
We include the budget b in the definition of the demand system, even though for exchange
markets the budget of agent i uniquely defined by the prices as p⊤e(i). This formalism will be
useful for our algorithm where the budgets are defined according to a slightly different set of prices.
Definition 2.1 (Market equilibrium). Let Di denote the demand system of agent i ∈ A. We say
that the prices p ∈ Rm+ and bundles x
(i) ∈ Rm+ form a market equilibrium if (i) x
(i) ∈ Di(p, p
⊤e(i)),
and (ii)
∑n
i=1 x
(i)
j ≤ ej , with equality whenever pj > 0, for all j ∈ G.
That is, p and optimal bundles x(i) form an equilibrium if no good is overdemanded and goods
at a positive price are fully sold. Note that this implies that every agent fully spends their budget.
Definition 2.2. Let (p, b) ∈ Rm+1+ and x ∈ D(p, b). If for any p
′ ≥ p and b′ ≥ b there exists
y ∈ D(p′, b′) such that yj ≥ xj whenever p
′
j = pj, we say that the demand system D satisfies the
weak gross substitutes (WGS) property.
We will also say that D(p, b) is a WGS demand system. In the context of the taˆtonnement
process, the weak gross substitutes property is usually defined with respect to the aggregate excess
demand function of all agents. We use the stronger requirement of having a WGS demand system
for each individual agent. The previous auction algorithms [44, 45] have also used WGS on the level
of agents as this seems to be the necessary condition that allows agents to update their bundles
individually, as opposed to taˆtonnement, where the prices adjustments react to the aggregate
demands. We note that WGS demands for individual agents are also assumed in the context of
indivisible goods.
Definition 2.3 (Demand oracle). For a WGS demand system D(p, b), a demand oracle requires
two vectors (p, b), (p′, b′) ∈ Rm+1+ such that (p
′, b′) ≥ (p, b), and a vector x ∈ D(p, b). The output is
a vector y ∈ D(p′, b′) such that that yj ≥ xj whenever p
′
j = pj.
In other words, the oracle provides the allocations guaranteed by the definitions of WGS systems.
The complex form of the definition is due to the possible non-uniqueness of demand bundles. For
simple demand systems, the input to the oracle is simply a vector (p′, b′) ∈ Rm+1+ , and the output
is the unique vector y ∈ D(p′, b′).
For exchange markets, we will make the following assumptions:
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Assumption 1 (Scale invariance). For every agent i, Di(p, bi) = Di(αp, αbi) for all α > 0.
That is, we require that the demand is homogeneous of degree 0; informally, the demand does
not depend on the currency. This is a standard assumption in microeconomics and exchange
markets, see e.g. [5, 33, 35, 53].
Assumption 2 (Non-satiation). For all demand systems, and for every (p, b) ∈ Rm+1+ , and every
x ∈ D(p, b), we have p⊤x = b.
That is, in every optimal bundle the agents must fully spend their budgets. This is a standard
assumption for exchange markets as it is necessary for the fundamental theorems of welfare eco-
nomics (see e.g. [52, Chapter 16]). However, we note that we will not require this assumption in
Section 5 for spending restricted Fisher markets.
Approximate equilibria Let us now define the concept of an ǫ-equilibrium in exchange markets
that our algorithm will find. We require that each agent gets an approximate optimal bundle and
market clears approximately.
Definition 2.4 (Approximate equilibrium). For an ǫ > 0, the prices p ∈ Rm and bundles x(i) ∈ Rm+
form an ǫ-approximate market equilibrium if the following hold.
(i) x(i) ≤ z(i) for some z(i) ∈ Di(p
(i), p⊤e(i)), where p ≤ p(i) ≤ (1 + ǫ)p,
(ii)
∑n
i=1 x
(i)
j ≤ ej , and
(iii)
∑m
j=1 pj
(
ej −
∑n
i=1 x
(i)
j
)
≤ ǫp⊤e.
That is, every agent owns a subset of their optimal bundle at prices that are within a factor (1+ǫ)
from p, and all goods are nearly sold: the value of the unsold goods is at most an ǫ fraction of the
total value of the goods. The total value of the goods “taken away” from the near-optimal bundles
of the agents is
∑n
i=1 p
⊤(z(i)−x(i)). Parts (i) and (iii), together with the fact that p(i)
⊤
z(i) ≤ p⊤e(i)
for all i, imply that this amount is ≤ 2ǫp⊤e.
The definition (i) can be seen as a natural extension of the corresponding approximate optimality
conditions in [42, 44, 45]. For linear utilities, [42] requires the approximate maximum bang-per-
buck condition vij/pj ≤ (1 + ǫ)vik/pk for any agent i, goods j and k such that xik > 0. Thus, one
can set approximate prices p ≤ p(i) ≤ (1 + ǫ)p for each agent for which they purchase maximum
bang-per-buck goods.
Condition (iii) corresponds to the definition of approximate equilibrium in [32] and [46]. This
notion is weaker than the ones used in [42, 44, 45]. The most important difference is that the latter
papers guarantee that each agent recovers approximately their optimal utility. Such a property
could be achieved by strengthening the bound in (iii) from ǫp⊤e to ǫpminemin, where pmin is the
minimum price and emin is the smallest total fractional amount in the initial endowment of any
agent. However, this would come at the expense of substantially worse running time guarantees in
our algorithmic framework.
2.2 Examples of WGS demand systems
A standard way to implement a demand oracle is via an explicitly given utility function. Assume
the agent is equipped with a concave utility function u : Rm+ → R+. The set of demand bundles at
prices p and budget b it given as the set of optimal solutions of
max u(x) s.t. p⊤x ≤ b; x ≥ 0 . (1)
Then, D(p, b) := Du(p, b) = argmaxx∈Rm+ {u(x) : p
⊤x ≤ b}. We say that a utility function is WGS
if the corresponding demand system is WGS. Most models studied in the literature assume strictly
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concave utilities and thus have a unique optimal solution; a notable exception is the case of linear
utility functions. If the solution is not unique, we can implement the demand oracle for inputs
(p, b), (p′, b′) and x ∈ D(p, b) by imposing the constraints that u(y) equals the optimal utility in
D(p′, b′), and yi ≥ xi for every i with p
′
i = pi. Thus, the optimal demand system can also be
implemented via convex programming (we now ignore the question of numerical precision). We
note that for linear utilities, implementing the demand oracle is straightforward.
We now present some classical examples of WGS utilities previously studied in the literature.
• For v ∈ Rm+ the linear utility is given by u(x) = v
⊤x. Then, Du(p, b) = argmax{v⊤x : p⊤x ≤ b}.
• The constant elasticity of substitution (CES) utility is defined by u(x) =
(∑
j β
1
σ
j x
σ−1
σ
j
) σ
σ−1
,
where
∑
j βj = 1. Then, D(b, p) = {x} for the unique optimal bundle x given by xj =
βjp
−σ
j b∑
k βkp
1−σ
k
. It is well-known that CES demand system satisfies the WGS property iff σ > 1.
• The Cobb-Douglas utility function is given by u(x) =
∏
j x
αj
j where
∑
j αj = 1, α ≥ 0. The
unique optimal bundle is therefore xj = bαj/pj and D
u(p, b) = {x}. The Cobb-Douglas utility
function satisfies the WGS property for any parameter choices.
• The nested CES utility function is defined recursively (see [47] for more details). Any CES
function is a nested CES function. If g, h1, . . . , ht are nested CES functions, then f(x) =
max g(h1(x
1), . . . , ht(x
t)) over all x1, . . . , xt such that
∑t
k=1 x
k = x, is a nested CES function.
In a well-studied special case (see e.g., [49]), each good j can only be used in at most one of the
hi’s. Such a nested CES function can be represented as a tree.
Conic combinations of demand systems Given two WGS utility functions u and u′, the
demand system corresponding to their sum u+ u′ may not be WGS. On the other hand, consider
two simple WGS demand systems D and D′ and nonnegative coefficients λ, λ′. Then it is easy
to see that λD + λ′D′ is also a simple WGS demand system. This enables the construction of
some interesting demand systems. For example, [53] has studied hybrids of CES and Cobb-Douglas
demands, where the demand system can be given as
xj =
b
pj
[
ǫαj + (1− ǫ)
βjp
1−σ
j∑
k βkp
1−σ
k
]
,
for some 0 ≤ ǫ ≤ 1 and σ > 1.1
Note that if D = Du and D′ = Du
′
for some concave utility functions u and u′, the demand
system λD+ λ′D′ will in general not correspond to the utility function λu+ λ′u′. In fact, it seems
unclear if one can explicitly write utility functions corresponding to such convex combinations. Our
model does not require the demand system to be given in the form D = Du for some function u.
Price elasticity of demands One possible implementation of the key subroutine FindNew-
Prices (Section 3) relies on the (price) elasticity of the demands.2 The standard definition of the
elasticity for good j with respect to the price of good k is ej,k = ∂ log xj(p, b)/∂ log pk, where xj(p, b)
is the (unique) demand for good j at prices p and budget b. The WGS property guarantees that
ej,k ≥ 0 if j 6= k, and consequently, ek,k ≤ 0. The definition below corresponds to ek,k ≥ −f for all
k ∈ [m], for the more general model of non-simple demand systems.
1We note that this demand function does not seem to correspond to a nested CES utility function.
2No finite lower bound can be given on the elasticity of linear demand systems. If we are buying a positive amount
of good j, that means that j maximizes vk/pk. If there is another good ℓ with vj/pj = vℓ/pℓ, then if we increase pj
but leave the other prices unchanged, then x′j = 0 for every optimal bundle x
′ with respect to the new prices. Hence,
for this case, we have another way to implement FindNewPrices in Lemma 3.8.
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Definition 2.5. Consider a WGS demand system D(p, b). For some f > 0, we say that the
elasticity of D(p, b) is at least −f , if for any µ ≥ 0, j ∈ [m], (p, b) ∈ Rm+1+ and x ∈ D(p, b), if we
define p′ as p′j = pj(1 + µ) and p
′
k = pk for k ∈ [m] \ {j}, then there exists a bundle x
′ ∈ D(p′, b)
such that x′j ≥
1
(1+µ)f
xj.
The following bounds are easy to verify from the definitions. The proof is given in Appendix A.
Lemma 2.6. The CES demand system with parameter σ > 1 has elasticity at least −σ, and the
Cobb-Douglas demand system has elasticity at least −1.
Separable and uniformly separable WGS utility functions The auction algorithm in [42]
was later extended in [45] to separable WGS utility functions, that is, u =
∑
j∈G uj where each
uj is a WGS utility function depending only on good j. This model was further generalized in
[44] to uniformly separable WGS utility functions, that is, ∂u(x)∂xj = fj(xj)g(x), where each fj is a
strictly decreasing function. This class already includes CES and Cobb-Douglas utilities; however,
it does not appear to extend to demand systems obtained as their conic combinations, where even
the explicit form of the utility function is unclear. Further, the running time bound stated in [44]
is unbounded for the CES and Cobb-Douglas cases; see Appendix B.1 for further discussion.
3 Auction algorithm for exchange markets
The algorithm (shown in Algorithm 1) uses the accuracy parameter 0 < ǫ < 0.25, and returns a
4ǫ-approximate equilibrium. We initialize all prices pj = 1 and the prices will only increase during
the algorithm, in increments by a factor (1 + ǫ). This initialization is enabled by Assumption 1
that guarantees the existence of market clearing prices where all positive prices are ≥ 1.3
We maintain a price vector p called the market prices; the budget of agent i ∈ [n] is bi = p
⊤e(i)
at the current prices. Further, every agent i ∈ [n] maintains individual prices p(i) such that
p ≤ p(i) ≤ (1 + ǫ)p. At any point of the algorithm, agent i owns a bundle c(i) of the goods such
that c(i) ≤ x(i) for some x(i) ∈ Di(p
(i), bi). Some amount of good j is sold at the lower price pj ,
and some at the higher price (1 + ǫ)pj . The price agent i has to pay for good j is the higher price
(1 + ǫ)pj if p
(i)
j = (1 + ǫ)pj and the lower price pj otherwise. (Note that this is in contrast with
[42] and the other previous auction algorithms where i may pay pj for some amount of good j and
(1 + ǫ)pj for another amount.)
We consider the agents one-by-one. If an agent i has surplus money, they use the subroutine
FindNewPrices to update their prices p(i) and bundle x(i), by maintaining x
(i)
j ≥ c
(i)
j — this latter
requirement turns out to be the main challenge. They will then try to purchase x
(i)
j − c
(i)
j amount
of good j in the Outbid procedure. They start by purchasing any unsold amount of good at price
pj. If they still need more, then they will outbid other agents who have been paying the lower price
pj for this good, by offering the higher price (1 + ǫ)pj. Once good j is sold only at the higher price
(1 + ǫ)pj, we increase the price of the good. If no price is increased, we move to the next agent.
Otherwise, we announce the new prices p and repeat. The algorithm terminates once the total
surplus of the agents drops below 3ǫp⊤e. At this point, we can conclude that the current prices
and allocations form a 4ǫ-approximate equilibrium.
We express the running time of the algorithm in terms of the running time TF of the subroutine
FindNewPrices, as well as the upper bound on the ratio pmax/pmin of the largest and smallest
nonzero prices at any ǫ-equilibrium. Such an upper bound may be obtained for the specific demand
3Even though there might be goods priced at 0 in an equilibrium, we can always find an ǫ-approximate equilibrium
where all prices are positive.
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systems.4 Alternatively, one can follow the approach of the papers [23, 25] by adding a dummy
agent with a Cobb-Douglas demand system and an initial endowment of a small fraction of all
goods. In the presence of such an agent, we can obtain a strong bound on pmax/pmin, at the
expense of obtaining a slightly worse approximation guarantee. We describe the construction in
Appendix B.2.
Note that for (approximate-)equilibrium prices p, αp also gives (approximate-)equilibrium prices
with the same allocation, for any α > 0. In our algorithm, the minimum price will remain at most
1 + ǫ throughout, see Lemma 3.4.
Theorem 3.1. Let TF be an upper bound on the running time of the subroutine FindNewPrices.
Algorithm 1 finds a 4ǫ-approximate market equilibrium in time O
(
nmTF
ǫ2
· log
(
pmax
pmin
))
.
We assume that TF = Ω(m), since the output needs to return an m-dimensional vector of
goods. There are various options for implementing FindNewPrices. In Section 3.2 we present a
simple price increment procedure in case of bounded elasticities; recall the elasticity bound f from
Definition 2.5. Using this subroutine and Lemma 3.7, we obtain the following overall bound.
Theorem 3.2. If all agents have elasticity at least −f for some f > 0, then an ǫ-approximate
equilibrium can be computed in time O
(
nm2f ·TD
ǫ2
· log
(
pmax
pmin
))
, where TD is the time needed for
one call to the demand oracle.
As noted earlier, there are simple demand systems such as linear demand systems where the
flexibility parameter cannot be bounded. However, in case the demand system is given in the form
(1) via a utility function that is homogeneous of degree one, we can obtain an implementation of
FindNewPrices by solving a convex program. This is described in Section 6. This is in particular
applicable for CES utilities with σ > 1 and Cobb-Douglas utilities. One could find further possible
ways for implementing FindNewPrices for particular demand systems; for example, we give a
simple direct procedure for linear utilities in Lemma 3.8, and a procedure for budget-additive
SPLC utilities in Section 7.
We give an overview of the running times of the previous auction algorithms in Appendix B.1.
Invariants Let us now summarize the invariant properties maintained throughout the algorithm.
We say that a bundle y dominates the bundle x if x ≤ y.
(a) Each good is partitioned into three parts according to the price it is being sold at:
• amount wj is the unsold part of the good,
• amount lj is sold at the lower price pj, and
• amount hj is sold at the higher price (1 + ǫ)pj.
Moreover, wj + lj > 0, i.e., there is always a part of the good that is unsold or owned by an
agent at the lower price.
(b) The unsold amount wj of each good is non-increasing. If wj > 0 then pj = 1.
(c) The budget of agent i is bi = p
⊤e(i). Each agent i maintains prices p(i) such that p ≤ p(i) ≤
(1 + ǫ)p, and owns a bundle c(i) that is dominated by a bundle x(i) ∈ Di(p
(i), bi).
(d) For the amount c
(i)
j of good j, agent i pays
• the price pj for goods in Li := {j ∈ [m] : p
(i)
j < (1 + ǫ)pj}, and
4For demand systems given by an explicit utility function in the form (1), we give such a bound for spending-
restricted Fisher-equilibria in Section 5.2.
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Algorithm 1: Auction algorithm for exchange markets
Input: Demand systems Di, and the endowment vectors e
(i), and ǫ ∈ (0, 0.25).
Output: A 4ǫ-approximate market equilibrium.
1 Initialization: for all i, j set pj ← 1, p
(i)
j ← 1, c
(i)
j ← 0, wj = ej =
∑
i e
(i)
j , and lj = 0;
NewIt for i ∈ [n] do // recompute the budgets and surpluses
3 bi ← p
⊤e(i); si ← bi −
∑
j∈Li
c
(i)
j pj −
∑
j∈Hi
c
(i)
j (1 + ǫ)pj
4 end
5 if
∑n
i=1 si ≤ 3ǫp
⊤e then return p, {p(i)}i∈[n] and {c
(i)}i∈[n];
NewStp for i ∈ [n] with si > 0 do // step for agent i
7 (p˜, y)← FindNewPrices(i, p(i), p, ǫ, c(i), bi);
8 for j = 1 to m do
9 if p
(i)
j < (1 + ǫ)pj and p˜j = (1 + ǫ)pj then // Case 1
10 si ← si − c
(i)
j · ǫpj ; lj ← lj − c
(i)
j ; // i pays (1 + ǫ)pj instead of pj
11 Outbid(i, j, yj − c
(i)
j );
12 else if p
(i)
j = (1 + ǫ)pj and p˜j = (1 + ǫ)pj then // Case 2
13 Outbid(i, j, yj − c
(i)
j );
14 end
// Skip the goods with p
(i)
j < (1 + ǫ)pj and p˜j < (1 + ǫ)pj. Case 3
15 end
16 p(i) ← p˜; flag ← 0;
17 for j ∈ [m] with wj + lj = 0 do
18 pj ← (1 + ǫ)pj ; lj = ej ; // price increase
19 foreach k ∈ [n] do p
(k)
j ← (1 + ǫ)pj ;
20 flag ← 1;
21 end
22 if flag = 1 then go to NewIt;
23 end
Procedure Outbid(i, j, t)
// t is the amount of good j agent i wants to outbid.
1 if wj > 0 then // a part of j is unsold
2 τ = min{wj , t};
3 wj ← wj − τ ; c
(i)
j ← c
(i)
j + τ ; t← t− τ ;
4 si ← si − τ · (1 + ǫ)pj; // here pj = 1 always
5 end
6 while t > 0 and lj > 0 do
7 Let k ∈ [n] be such that c
(k)
j > 0 and p
(k)
j = pj . Set τ = min{c
(k)
j , t};
8 c
(k)
j ← c
(k)
j − τ ; c
(i)
j ← c
(i)
j + τ ; // i outbids k
9 sk ← sk + τ · pj; si ← si − τ · (1 + ǫ)pj ; lj ← lj − τ ; t← t− τ ;
10 end
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• the price (1 + ǫ)pj for goods in Hi := {j ∈ [m] : p
(i)
j = (1 + ǫ)pj} = [m] \ Li.
In accordance with (d), the surplus of agent i is defined as
si := bi −
∑
j∈Li
c
(i)
j pj −
∑
j∈Hi
c
(i)
j (1 + ǫ)pj .
The Outbid subroutine An important subroutine, described in Procedure Outbid, controls
how the ownership of goods may change. If agent k has paid price pj on a certain amount of good
j, then agent i may take over some of this amount by offering a higher price (1+ ǫ)pj . We may also
have i = k, in which case the agent outbids themselves. We also incorporate into the procedure
the case when a certain amount of a good is being purchased for the first time. Note that pj = 1
at this point due to invariant (b).
Main iterations The algorithm is partitioned into iterations. Each iteration finishes when the
price of a good increases from pj to (1+ ǫ)pj. At every such event, the budgets bi of the agents also
increase. Therefore, at the start of an iteration each agent i recomputes their budget at line NewIt.
An iteration is further partitioned into steps, which are single executions of the main for loop in
Algorithm 1. The algorithm terminates as soon as the total surplus drops below 3ǫp⊤e.
Steps Suppose we are considering agent i. By invariant (c), the agent is buying a bundle c(i) ≤ x(i)
for some x(i) ∈ Di(p
(i), bi). The subroutine FindNewPrices(i, p
(i), p, ǫ, c(i), bi) delivers new prices
p˜ and a bundle y such that
(A) y ≥ c(i) for y ∈ Di(p˜, bi), and
(B) p(i) ≤ p˜ ≤ (1 + ǫ)p, and p˜j = (1 + ǫ)pj whenever yj > (1 + ǫ) c
(i)
j .
In other words, Condition (A) says that agent i still wants whatever they own even at the
increased prices p˜. Condition (B) is the crucial one for the outbid. It guarantees that p˜ ≥ p(i), and
whenever an agent wants to buy more of some good than they already own at least by a factor 1+ǫ,
then they are willing to pay the higher price (1 + ǫ)pj for it. (They might already be paying the
increased price to start with if p
(i)
j = (1 + ǫ)pj. In this case p˜j = (1 + ǫ)pj = p
(i)
j .) The description
of this subroutine is postponed to Section 3.2. Observe that FindNewPrices will make progress
whenever c(i) is far from x(i) for some agent i. When they are very close for each agent i, then we
have already reached an approximate equilibrium.
The above properties suggest the following update rules for each good j ∈ [m].
Case 1. p
(i)
j < (1 + ǫ)pj and p˜j = (1 + ǫ)pj . The good j was in Li and needs to be moved
to Hi, i.e., agent i used to pay pj but now is willing to pay the higher price for j. Agent i first
outbids themselves for the amount c
(i)
j they already own and starts paying pj(1+ǫ) for this amount.
Additionally, agent i outbids on good j up to the amount they want and that is available from the
other agents.
Case 2. p
(i)
j = (1 + ǫ)pj and p˜j = (1 + ǫ)pj. The good j was in Hi and stays in Hi, i.e., agent
i continues to pay the higher price. The agent i still keeps the amount c
(i)
j of good j that they
already had and outbids for as much as they can from the other agents.
Case 3. p
(i)
j < (1 + ǫ)pj and p˜j < (1 + ǫ)pj . The good j remains in Li, i.e., agent i continues to
pay the lower price. By (B), we must have c
(i)
j ≤ yj ≤ (1 + ǫ)c
(i)
j ; the agent will not seek to buy
more of these goods.
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The cases above have covered all possibilities since p
(i)
j ≤ p˜j. Note that in the first two cases
the agent will own min(yj , lj + wj) amount of good j, whereas they will own c
(i)
j amount in the
third case. Once all of the goods have been considered we set p(i) = p˜, x(i) = y, and update c(i) as
the current allocation. If wj + lj = 0 for some j then hj = ej , i.e., the whole j is sold at the higher
price pj(1+ ǫ). For each such good j we increase the market price pj to (1+ ǫ)pj , and for all agents
k we set p
(k)
j = pj for the new increased pj; finally, we set lj = ej and hj = 0. The step ends.
3.1 Analysis
For the correctness of the algorithm, we need to show that all invariants are maintained.
Lemma 3.3. If all agents have WGS demand systems, then the invariants (a)-(d) are maintained
throughout the algorithm.
Proof. (a) We always sell the goods at either price pj or at price (1 + ǫ)pj. Moreover, at the end
of the step if we have a good with wj + lj = 0, we increase its price and set lj = ej and hence,
wj + lj > 0 holds again.
(b) Once a part of some good is sold to some agent, it remains being sold to the agents until the
end of the algorithm. This is guaranteed by property (A) of the procedure FindNewPrices, and
the fact that c
(i)
j may only decrease if another c
(k)
j increases by the same amount. Prices can be
increased only for goods with wj + lj = 0. Consequently, a good with wj > 0 must still be at
the initial price pj = 1.
(c) Suppose these properties hold for every agent before a step of agent i. The requirements (A)
and (B) guarantee that c(i) is dominated by a bundle x(i) ∈ Di(p
(i), bi) and prices satisfy p ≤
p(i) ≤ (1 + ǫ)p, for each agent i.
Now, consider an agent k different from i. In the step, k could only lose a part a good through
the outbid and hence c(k) does not increase. As long as the prices p(k) do not change, (c) trivially
holds. The only time p(k) can change is the price increase step, namely, if pj increases to (1+ǫ)pj,
it forces p
(k)
j = (1 + ǫ)pj. Note that the price increase only happens once lj = 0. Assume we
had p
(k)
j < (1 + ǫ)pj before the price increase, that is, agent k was buying good j at the lower
price pj. By lj = 0 and invariant (d), it follows that c
(k)
j = 0 at this point. The WGS property
implies that after increasing p
(k)
j , the bundle c
(k) will be still dominated by an optimal bundle.
To complete the proof of (c), it remains to show that it is maintained at the beginning of the
iteration, when the budgets are recomputed. Since the budgets may only increase, this again
follows by the WGS property.
(d) Straightforward to check for each case.
Lemma 3.4. The smallest price min{pj : j ∈ G} remains at most (1+ǫ) throughout the algorithm.
Proof. As long as wj > 0 for at least one good j, then the minimum price is 1 according to invariant
(b). Assume that at a certain iteration, wj = 0 for all j ∈ G, and consider the first iteration when
this happens. This iteration may raise the minimum price to (1 + ǫ). We claim that the algorithm
must terminate in the next iteration in line 5. Let s¯i be the excess by charging the lower price pj
for all goods (both in Hi and Li). Clearly, s¯i ≥ si.
We also claim that s¯i ≥ 0. In the subroutine FindNewPrices, we had c
(i) ≤ y ∈ Di(p˜, bi)
and p ≤ p˜. After the subroutine was last executed for i, prices may have increased. However,
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this may have only increased bi, and a price pj may have increased to (1 + ǫ)pj if we already had
p˜j = (1 + ǫ)pj .
Since all goods are fully sold by invariant (b),
∑
i∈A s¯i =
∑
i∈A bi − p
⊤e = 0. Consequently,
s¯i = 0 and therefore si ≤ 0 for all i ∈ A.
Next, we give a bound on the total number of iterations, using the same basic idea of organizing
the steps into rounds as in [42]. A round consists of going over all agents exactly once in the main
‘for’ loop and doing a step for each of them; that is, a round comprises at most n steps.
Lemma 3.5. The number of rounds in an iteration is at most 2/ǫ.
Proof. Let us fix an iteration and denote with p the market prices at the start of the iteration.
Consider a step of an agent i within the iteration. If from a good j, i buys everything that is
available at the cheaper price pj , then the market price of j increases and the iteration finishes. So
for the rest of the proof we assume that the market price increase does not happen; consequently,
the budget of each agent is unchanged and agent i gets the amount of each good it desires.
Let ϕ denote the total amount of money spent at a certain point of this iteration that is spent
by the agents on higher price goods. That is,
ϕ = (1 + ǫ)
n∑
i=1
∑
j∈Hi
c
(i)
j pj.
Claim 3.6. Let si denote the surplus of agent i at the beginning of their step. Then the value of ϕ
increases at least by si − 2.25ǫbi in the step of agent i.
Proof. Recall Cases 1-3 in the description of the step. Let Tk be the set of goods that fall into case
k, that is, T1 ∪ T2 ∪ T3 = [m].
• If j ∈ T1, then (1 + ǫ)pjyj amount will be added to ϕ in the Outbid subroutine: In this case,
the agent also outbids itself, moving the good from Li to Hi.
• If j ∈ T2, then (1 + ǫ)pj(yj − c
(i)
j ) amount will be added to ϕ in the Outbid subroutine.
• If j ∈ T3, then we do not increase ϕ. Nevertheless, (B) guarantees that p˜j(yj − c
(i)
j ) ≤ ǫp˜jc
(i)
j .
Consequently, ∑
j∈T3
p˜j(yj − c
(i)
j ) ≤ ǫp˜
⊤c(i). (2)
Also note that p˜j = (1+ǫ)pj if j ∈ T1∪T2. Assumption 2 on non-satiation guarantees that p˜
⊤y = bi.
Let ∆ϕ denote the increment in ϕ; this can be lower bounded as
∆ϕ =
∑
j∈T1
p˜jyj +
∑
j∈T2
p˜j(yj − c
(i)
j ) = p˜
⊤y −
∑
j∈T3
p˜jyj −
∑
j∈T2
p˜jc
(i)
j
≥ bi −
∑
j∈T3
p˜j(yj − c
(i)
j )− p˜
⊤c(i) ≥ bi − (1 + ǫ)p˜
⊤c(i) ,
using (2). The money spent by the agent at the beginning of the step is bi−si. Good j is purchased
at price at least pj according to (d), and p˜j ≤ (1 + ǫ)pj. Consequently, p˜
⊤c(i) ≤ (1 + ǫ)(bi − si).
With the above inequality, we obtain
∆ϕ ≥ bi − (1 + ǫ)
2(bi − si) ≥ si − 2.25ǫbi,
using that ǫ < 0.25. This completes the proof. 
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As long as
∑n
i=1 si > 3ǫp
⊤e, the claim guarantees that ϕ increases in every round by at least
3ǫp⊤e− 2.25ǫ
∑n
i=1 bi > 0.5ǫp
⊤e. Since ϕ ≤ p⊤e, the number of rounds is bounded by 2/ǫ.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. In their steps, agents use their surpluses to outbid for the goods. Let us
now bound the number of repeats in the ‘while’ cycles (lines 6–9) in all calls to Outbid in a given
iteration. When the Outbid(i, j, t) is called, the ‘while’ loop is repeated until t is set to 0. Before
this happens, some c
(k)
j value must be set to zero. The total number of such events within a single
iteration is bounded by nm — each agent loses a good through the outbid at most once.
Hence, the number of ‘while’ calls is at most nm plus the total number of calls to Outbid. This
is at most m in each step, and thus nm in each round. According to Lemma 3.5, the number of
repeats ‘while’ calls in every iteration is 2nm/ǫ; each repeat takes O(1) time. The same bound
holds for the ’if’ calls in lines 1–4 in Outbid.
Every step calls the procedure FindNewPrices exactly once. Therefore, the time taken by
FindNewPrices in an iteration is O(nTF /ǫ). According to Lemma 3.4, the minimum price remains
at most 1+ǫ throughout. Hence, the number of iterations is bounded by O(m log1+ǫ(pmax/pmin)) =
O(mǫ log(pmax/pmin)). The claimed running time bound follows, using also the assumption TF =
Ω(m).
It is left to show that the prices p and bundles c(i) form a 4ǫ-approximate market equilibrium.
The first two properties in the definition are clear: c(i) is dominated by an optimal bundle with
respect to the prices p(i), and no good is oversold. At termination, the total surplus of the agents is
bounded by 3ǫp⊤e. However, this surplus is computed assuming that some goods are sold at price
pj and others at price (1+ ǫ)pj . Decreasing the price of the latter goods to pj releases an additional
excess of at most ǫp⊤e. Consequently,
∑m
j=1 pj(e−
∑n
i=1 c
(i)
j ) ≤ 4ǫp
⊤e.
3.2 Implementing FindNewPrices for bounded elasticities
We now describe the subroutine FindNewPrices(i, p(i), p, ǫ, c(i), bi). Recall that the outputs are
new prices p˜ ≥ p(i) and a bundle y with
(A) y ≥ c(i) for y ∈ Di(p˜, bi), and
(B) p(i) ≤ p˜ ≤ (1 + ǫ)p, and p˜j = (1 + ǫ)pj whenever yj > (1 + ǫ) c
(i)
j .
Let us assume that the demand systemDi has elasticity at least−f for some f > 0. Our Algorithm 2
for this case is a simple price increment procedure. First, we obtain y ∈ Di(p
(i), bi) from the demand
oracle with y ≥ c(i). This is possible due to invariant (c), which guarantees that c(i) ≤ x(i) for some
x(i) ≤ Di(p
(i), bi). Then, the demand oracle is able to return a bundle y such that y ≥ x
(i) ≥ c(i).
Then, we iterate the following step. As long as (B) is violated for a good j, we increase its price
by a factor (1 + ǫ)1/f until it reaches the upper bound (1 + ǫ)pj.
Lemma 3.7. Assume the demand system Di has elasticity at least −f for some f > 0. Algorithm 2
terminates with p˜ and y satisfying (A) and (B) in time O(mf · TD), where TD is the time for a
call to the demand oracle.
We will assume that TD = Ω(m), since the demand oracle needs to output an m-dimensional
vector.
Proof. The bound on the number of iterations is clear: since we have p ≤ p˜ ≤ (1+ ǫ)p throughout,
the price of every good can increase at most f times. Condition (A) is satisfied due to the WGS
property and the bound on the demand elasticity. When increasing p˜j, the demand yk for k 6= j
is non-decreasing as guaranteed by the demand oracle. Further, yj may decrease only by a factor
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Algorithm 2: Finding new prices
Input: i, p(i), p, ǫ, c(i), f, bi.
Output: Prices p˜ and bundle y.
1 Initialization: p˜← p(i) ;
2 Obtain y ∈ Di(p˜, bi) from the demand oracle with y ≥ c
(i) ;
3 while ∃j : p˜j < (1 + ǫ)pj and yj > (1 + ǫ)c
(i)
j do
4 p˜j ← min{(1 + ǫ)
1/f p˜j, (1 + ǫ)pj} ;
5 Obtain y′ ∈ Di(p˜, bi) from the demand oracle such that y
′
k ≥ yk for k 6= j ;
6 y ← y′ ;
7 end
8 return (p˜, y) ;
(1 + ǫ), and since we had yj > (1 + ǫ)c
(i)
j before the price update, we still have yj > c
(i)
j after the
price update. Condition (B) is satisfied at termination since the while loop keeps running as long
as it is violated. Checking the while condition each time requires O(m) time; however, this will be
dominated by the time TD according to the comment on TD ≥ m above.
As explained in Section 3, this is only one of the possible ways of implementing FindNewPrices.
Section 6 presents a convex programming approach for utilities that are homogeneous of degree 1.
For example, for CES with parameter σ > 1, the running time of Algorithm 2 depends linearly on σ
(Lemma 2.6), whereas the running time in Section 6 is independent on this parameter. Nevertheless,
for small values of σ the simple price increment procedure may be preferable to solving a convex
program.
Further, more direct approaches for implementing FindNewPricesmay be possible for particular
demand systems. For Cobb-Douglas demands with parameter vector α(i), it is easy to devise an
O(m) time algorithm implementing the procedure. The algorithm relies on the fact that the
optimal bundle is the bundle that allocates α
(i)
j bi money for good j. Hence, each price can be
set independently of the others. The next lemma shows an implementation of FindNewPrices for
linear utilities; recall from Section 2.2 that the elasticity is unbounded in this case.
Lemma 3.8. FindNewPrices can be implemented in O(m) for a linear demand system correspond-
ing to the utility function u(x) = v⊤x.
Proof. Recall that for linear utilities y ∈ Di(p˜, b) yj > 0 if and only if j ∈ argmaxk vk/pk, called
maximum bang-per-buck goods (MBB). We initialize p˜ = p(i), and let S ⊆ [m] denote the set of
MBB goods. We start increasing the prices of all goods j ∈ S at the same rate α. Once a good
outside S becomes MBB, we include it in the set S and also start raising its price. We terminate
when the budget is exhausted or when the price p˜k for a good k ∈ S reaches the upper bound
(1+ǫ)pk. In the latter case, we return the bundle yj = c
(i)
j if j 6= k, and set yk = (bi−
∑
j 6=k p˜jcj)/p˜k;
clearly, yk ≥ c
(i)
k . These prices and allocations satisfy (A) and (B); in fact, we obtain (B) in the
stronger form that p˜j = (1+ ǫ)pj whenever yj > c
(i)
j . We need to add a good to S at most m times,
and thus we can implement the procedure in O(m) time.
4 Fisher markets and the Nash social welfare problem
Fisher markets are a well-studied special case of exchange markets, where the initial endowment
of agent i is δie for δi > 0 and therefore the relative budgets of the agents are independent of the
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prices. With appropriate normalization of the prices, we can assume that agent i arrives with a
fixed budget bi and that there is exactly one unit of each good. At an equilibrium, the agents
spend these budgets on their most preferred goods at the given prices. Let us now assume that the
demand systems are given via utility functions as in (1). Eisenberg and Gale [36] gave a convex
programming formulation of the market equilibrium problem for linear utilities. Eisenberg [35]
showed that the optimal solutions to the following convex program are in one-to-one correspondence
with the market equilibria assuming that the utility functions are homogenous of degree one, that
is, ui(αx) = αui(x) for any α > 0.
max
n∑
i=1
bi log ui(x
(i)) subject to
n∑
i=1
x
(i)
j ≤ 1, ∀j = 1, . . . ,m. (3)
We note that the equilibrium prices are given by the optimal Lagrange multipliers.
The Nash social welfare problem In the Nash social welfare (NSW) problem, we need to
allocate m indivisible items to n agents (m ≥ n), with agent i equipped with a utility function on
the subsets of goods. The goal is to find a partition S1 ∪ S2 ∪ . . . Sn = [m] of the goods in order to
maximize the geometric mean of the utilities, (
∏n
i=1 ui(Si))
1/n. This problem is NP-hard already
for additive utilities, that is, if ui(S) =
∑
j∈S vij .
The first constant factor approximation for this problem was given by Cole and Gkatzelis
[28]. Their approach was to first solve a continuous relaxation that corresponds to a divisible
market problem, and round the fractional optimal solution. The natural relaxation is exactly the
program (3) above with all bi = 1. For linear utilities, we can use the natural continuous extension
ui(x) =
∑
j∈S vijxij of the additive utility function. However, it is easy to see that this relaxation
has an unbounded integrality gap. Cole and Gkatzelis [28] introduced the notion of spending
restricted equilibrium that we now define in a slightly more general form.
Definition 4.1. Suppose there are n agents with demand systems Di(p, bi) and fixed budgets b ∈
R
n
+. Further, let us be given bounds t ∈ (0,∞)
m. The prices p ∈ Rm and allocations x(i) ∈ Di(p, bi)
form a Spending Restricted (SR) equilibrium with respect to t, if
∑
i x
(i)
j = min{1, tj/pj},∀j ∈ [m].
Note that the set of equilibria can be non-convex already for budget additive utilities as shown
in [38]; see Section 7 for the definition of this class of utilities.
At given prices p, we let aj(p) = aj = min{1, tj/pj} denote the available amount of good j.
That is, the amount of money spent on good j is bounded by tj. By setting tj = ∞ for all j, the
above reduces to the standard definition of Fisher market equilibrium.
The algorithm in [28] first computes a spending restricted equilibrium for linear Fisher markets
with bounds tj = 1, and show that this can be rounded to an integer solution of cost at most 2e
1/e
times the optimal NSW solution. Note that the spending restrictions cannot be directly added to
the formulation (3) since they involve the Lagrange multipliers p. An SR-equilibrium in [28] was
found via an extension of algorithms by Devanur et al. [31] and Orlin [56] for linear Fisher markets.
Subsequent work by Cole et al. [26] showed that a spending restricted equilibrium for the
linear markets can be obtained as an optimal solution of a convex program (extending a convex
formulation of linear Fisher market equilibrium that is different from (3)), and also improved the
approximation guarantee to 2 (the current best factor is 1.45 [8]). However, this convex formulation
is only known to work for linear utility functions.
Further work has studied the NSW problem for more general utility functions, following the same
strategy of first solving a spending-restricted market equilibrium problem then rounding. Anari
et al. [2] studied NSW with separable, piecewise-linear concave (SPLC) utilities. The paper [38]
15
studied budget-additive valuations, that correspond to the utility function ui(x) = min(ci,
∑
j uijxj).
Both papers find (exact or approximate) solutions to the corresponding spending-restricted market
equilibrium problem via fairly complex combinatorial algorithms.
The Gale demand systems The demand systems of the market models in [2, 38] do not exactly
correspond to (1). In [38] one needs additional conditions on the agents being “thrifty”; in [2] a
“utility market model” is used. In both cases, the total spending of the agents can be below their
budgets. A natural unified way of capturing these equilibrium concepts is via Gale demand systems,
defined as
Gu(p, b) = argmax
x∈Rm+
b log u(x)− p⊤x . (4)
We call b log u(x) − p⊤x the Gale objective function. It is easy to verify using Lagrangian duality
that if all ui’s are concave functions, and the utility functions correspond to the Gale demand
systems Di(p, b) = G
ui(p, b), then the program (3) always finds a market equilibrium; see [54] for
details. Moreover, if the utilities are homogenous of degree one, then this equilibrium coincides
with the equilibrium for the “standard” demand systems given by (1). For general concave utility
functions, the optimal bundles stay within the budget b (that is, p⊤x ≤ b), but may not exhaust it.
Finding a spending-restricted equilibrium for Gale demand systems appears to be the right setting
for NSW; in fact, the concepts used by [2] and [38] correspond to the Gale equilibrium in these
settings, and moreover, these Gale demand systems admit the WGS property, see Section 7. On
contrary, the demand systems arising from the previously mentioned utility functions do not satisfy
the WGS property in the usual setting (1).
We refer the reader to the paper by Nesterov and Shikhman [54] on Gale demand systems as
well as the more general concept of Fisher-Gale equilibrium; they also give a taˆtonnement type
algorithm for finding such an equilibrium.
Approximate spending-restricted equilibrium We use an extension of Definition 2.4 as our
approximate SR-equilibrium notion. The main difference is that we require all goods to be fully
consumed.
Definition 4.2 (Approximate SR-equilibrium). Let t ∈ [1,∞]m. For an ǫ > 0, the prices p ∈ Rm
and bundles x(i) ∈ Rm+ form an ǫ-approximate SR-equilibrium w.r.t. t if
(i) x(i) ≤ z(i) for some z(i) ∈ Di(p
(i), bi), where p ≤ p
(i) ≤ (1 + ǫ)p,
(ii)
∑n
i=1 x
(i)
j = aj := min{1, tj/pj} for all j, and
(iii)
∑m
j=1 pj
(∑n
i=1 z
(i)
j − aj
)
≤ ǫ
∑n
i=1 bi.
We note that whereas an equilibrium will always exist for WGS utilities, the existence of an
SR-equilibrium is a nontrivial question. For example, suppose an agent i has budget bi and Cobb-
Douglas utility function
∏m
j=1(x
(i)
j )
βj , where
∑
j βj = 1, such that βk >
1
bi
for some k with tk = 1.
Then the agent i would like to spend at least βkbi > 1 on good j for any prices p, but the total
money that can be spent on this good is capped at 1. Hence, there doesn’t exist any SR-equilibrium
in this case.
While we do not have general necessary and sufficient conditions on the existence of an SR-
equilibrium, we show that the objectives previously studied in the context of NSW admit an
SR-equilibrium. In the case of budget additive utilities, we have all tj = 1, and all bi = 1. An ǫ/n-
approximate SR-equilibrium satisfies the required accuracy in [38]. Whereas [2] computes an exact
SR-equilibrium, an approximate SR-equilibrium should be sufficient to obtain a (slightly worse)
approximation guarantee.
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In Section 7, we show that our algorithmic framework is applicable to compute an ǫ-equilibrium
for budget-additive SPLC, the common generalization of the models in [2] and [38]. Using a similar
rounding as in [38], we obtain a constant-factor approximation algorithm for maximizing NSW
in polynomial-time when agents have budget-additive SPLC utilities and goods come in multiple
copies. The previous algorithm for this setting in [17] runs in pseudopolynomial time. For the
special case of additive utilities, [10] gives such an algorithm.
5 Auction algorithm for spending restricted equilibrium
We present a modification of Algorithm 1 for finding an approximate SR-equilibrium in a Fisher
market where each agent satisfies the WGS property. The changes are fourfold. First, the budgets
bi are constant throughout the algorithm and are part of the input. As such, they do not depend on
the prices of goods in the market. Second, we need to account for the fact that in an SR-equilibrium
exactly min{1, tj/pj} of a good is sold. Third, the initialization must be changed since the prices
cannot be scaled up as for exchange markets: we cannot assume that there exists an SR-equilibrium
with pj ≥ 1 for all j. Fourth, we do not make Assumption 2 on non-satiation. We only use the
following weaker assumption, namely that after the prices increase, the spending of every agent is
non-decreasing.
Assumption 3. Let (p, b) ∈ Rm+1 and x ∈ D(p, b). If q ≥ p and y ∈ D(q, b), then q⊤y ≥ p⊤x.
For the case of budget-additive utilities, Assumption 2 does not hold, whereas this weaker
assumption is true.
We use the exact same variables as before, except that w is not used; we will have w = 0
throughout, i.e., all goods remain fully sold. We change the invariants (a) and (b) slightly. The
invariants (c) and (d) remain the same.
(a) The available amount aj of each good is partitioned into two parts according to the price it is
being sold at:
• amount lj is sold at the lower price pj, and
• amount hj is sold at the higher price (1 + ǫ)pj.
Moreover, lj > 0, i.e., there is always a part of the good owned by an agent at the lower price.
It holds lj + hj = aj.
(b) The amount of each good j being sold is exactly aj = min{1, tj/pj}.
Recall the definition of the surplus si = bi −
∑
j∈Li
c
(i)
j pj −
∑
j∈Hi
c
(i)
j (1 + ǫ)pj . In the modified
algorithm, we will use the relative surplus sri instead, defined as
sri := p
(i)⊤x(i) −
∑
j∈Li
c
(i)
j pj −
∑
j∈Hi
c
(i)
j (1 + ǫ)pj .
This is the difference between the money the agent would like to spend and what they are actually
spending (in accordance with (c) and (d)). Under Assumption 2, sri = si holds; we need to make
the distinction since we do not assume non-satiation.
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Initialization In the case of exchange markets, we used Assumption 1 to state that approximate
equilibrium prices ≥ 1 exist, and then we were able to initialize the algorithm by setting all prices
to 1. This is not viable for Fisher markets, where even the total budget might be smaller than m.
Instead, we assume that we are given some initial, small enough prices p¯ < t and optimal bundles
x(i) ∈ Di(p¯, bi) such that
∑n
i=1 x
(i) ≥ 1. A simple way to achieve this is to have a single agent that
overdemands all the goods, i.e., there is i ∈ [n] and p¯ < t such that x(i) ≥ 1 for x(i) ∈ Di(p¯, bi).
Such implementations would need to be given for the particular demands.
Given such prices and allocations, we initialize p(i) = p¯ for all i, and set all c(i)’s such that
c(i) ≤ x(i) and
∑
i c
(i) = 1. One can readily check that all invariants are satisfied after the
initialization. In particular, lj = 1, hj = 0 for all j ∈ [m].
Changes to the algorithm In procedure Outbid, lines 1-4 are redundant as wj = 0 for all j. In
the main part of the algorithm, one needs to make the following changes besides the initialization.
• Every occurrence of si is replaced by s
r
i .
• We do not need to recompute the budgets and surpluses at line NewIt.
• We need to add a new line between lines 18-19. The new line decreases the amount of good sold
to exactly min{1, tj/pj} by decreasing c
(i)
j for some agents i. This will decrease the amount of
goods sold whenever pj > tj.
Remark 5.1. A simple alternative initialization is to set the price of good j as pj = min{
ǫ
m
∑
i bi, tj},
and start with allocations c(i) = 0. The drawback is that we would obtain a slightly weaker equi-
librium at termination. Part (ii) of Definition 4.2 requires that all goods are fully sold; we would
need to weaken this property to saying that the total price of all unsold goods would be ≤ ǫ
∑
i bi.
Below, we describe the analysis for the case where initially all goods are fully sold, but it can be
easily adapted to this version.
5.1 Analysis
As previously mentioned, an (ǫ-)SR equilibrium may not exist at all. In such cases, our algorithm
will never terminate, increasing the prices unlimitedly. We give the running time in terms of the
ratio pSRmax/pmin. Here, pmin = minj p¯j , the smallest one among the initial prices, and pSRmax is
an upper bound on the prices in the algorithm; note that we may have pSRmax =∞. In Section 5.2,
we give a bound in terms of the maximum and minimum values of the partial derivatives of the
utility function.
Theorem 5.2. Let TF be an upper bound on the running time of the subroutine FindNewPrices.
Then there exists an auction algorithm that finds a 4ǫ-approximate SR equilibrium in time
O
(
nmTF
ǫ2
log
(
pSRmax
pmin
))
.
Lemma 5.3. If all agents have WGS demand systems, then the invariants (a)-(d) are maintained
throughout the algorithm.
Proof. The invariants (c) and (d) follow similarly as in the proof of Lemma 3.3. We only present
the proofs of (a) and (b) that have to be slightly modified.
(a) For each case it is clear that every good is being sold at either pj or (1 + ǫ)pj. Using the
invariant (b) it is also clear that exactly aj of good j is sold. Moreover, at the end of the step if
we have a good with lj = 0 we increase its price at line 18 and set lj = aj . Hence lj > 0 is also
satisfied.
18
(b) We need to show that exactly aj = max{1, tj/pj} of good j is sold at any point. Suppose that
the invariant holds at the beginning of a step. After the for loop, the invariant is still satisfied
since the outbid only changes the owner of the good. The invariant could be violated only at
line 18 when we increase the price at the end of the step. Trivially, if the price increases to
pj and it holds pj ≤ tj the invariant remains valid. So, we only need to deal with case when
the price of good j increases to pj and pj > tj . Then, in the new line we added between 18
and 19, we will immediately take away some of good j from the agents to make the invariant
valid again.
The bound on the number of rounds within an iteration is exactly the same as for Algorithm 1,
while the proof differs slightly due to using Assumption 3 instead of Assumption 2.
Lemma 5.4. The number of rounds in an iteration is at most 2/ǫ.
Proof. The only change arises at the end of the proof of Claim 3.6. We state the new claim and
show how the end of the proof changes.
Claim 5.5. Let sri denote the relative surplus of agent i at the beginning of their step. Then the
value of ϕ increases by at least sri − 2.25ǫbi in the step of agent i.
Let ∆ϕ denote the increment in ϕ; this can be lower bounded as
∆ϕ =
∑
j∈T1
p˜jyj +
∑
j∈T2
p˜j(yj − c
(i)
j ) = p˜
⊤y −
∑
j∈T3
p˜jyj −
∑
j∈T2
p˜jc
(i)
j
≥ p˜⊤y −
∑
j∈T3
p˜j(yj − c
(i)
j )− p˜
⊤c(i) ≥ p˜⊤y − (1 + ǫ)p˜⊤c(i) ,
using (2). The money spent by the agent at the beginning of the step is p(i)
⊤
x(i) − sri . Good
j is purchased at price at least pj according to (d), and p˜j ≤ (1 + ǫ)pj . Consequently, p˜
⊤c(i) ≤
(1 + ǫ)(p(i)
⊤
x(i) − sri ). Assumption 3 yields p˜
⊤y ≥ p(i)
⊤
x(i). Therefore, using ǫ < 0.25, we obtain
∆ϕ ≥ p˜⊤y − (1 + ǫ)2(p(i)
⊤
x(i) − sri ) ≥ s
r
i + p˜
⊤y − (1 + ǫ)2p(i)
⊤
x(i) ≥ sri − 2.25ǫp˜
⊤y ≥ sri − 2.25ǫbi ,
The claim follows.
Proof of Theorem 5.2. The running times follows similarly as in the proof of Theorem 3.1 so we
need to to show that the prices p and bundles c(i) form a 4ǫ-approximate SR equilibrium. The first
two properties in the definition are clear: c(i) is dominated by an optimal bundle x(i) with respect
to the prices p(i), and exactly aj = min{1, tj/pj} of each good j is sold. At termination, the total
relative surplus of the agents is bounded by 3ǫ
∑
i bi. Moreover,
n∑
i=1
sri =
n∑
i=1
p(i)
⊤
x(i) −
n∑
i=1

∑
j∈Li
c
(i)
j pj +
∑
j∈Hi
c
(i)
j (1 + ǫ)pj


≥
∑
p⊤x(i) − (1 + ǫ)
n∑
i=1
p⊤c(i) ≥ −ǫ
n∑
i=1
bi +
m∑
j=1
pj
(
n∑
i=1
x(i) − aj
)
.
Therefore,
∑m
j=1 pj(
∑n
i=1 x
(i)
j − aj) ≤ 4ǫ
∑
i bi.
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5.2 Conditions on the existence of SR-equilibria
We now present a general bound on the value of pSRmax. Suppose that the demand system of each
agent i is provided in terms of a monotone concave and differentiable utility function ui in the form
(1). We now assume that each ui is differentiable. The arguments here can be easily adopted for
the non-differentiable case by using subgradients. We let
D :=
maxi bi
pmin
, vimax := max
j
∂jui(0), vimin := min
j
{∂jui(D · 1) : ∂jui(0) > 0},
Vmax := max
i
vimax
vimin
,
tmax := max
j
tj.
(5)
Note that if ∂jui(0) = 0, then agent i is not interested in good j at all. In case ∂jui(0) > 0 we say
that agent i is interested in good j. Note that D is an upper bound on the maximum amount any
agent can buy from any good during the algorithm.
We note that tmax = ∞ could be possible. However, we can truncate the value of every tj to
min{tj,
∑
i bi} without changing the problem, since the total spending is at most the total budget;
the price of a good can never rise above this value in the algorithm or in an SR-equilibrium. Thus,
we may assume tmax ≤
∑
i bi in the bounds below.
A necessary condition on the existence of SR-equilibria The condition
∑
i bi ≤
∑
j tj is
necessary on the existence of an SR-equilibrium, since
∑
j tj is the total amount of money that can
be spent on the goods. One can formulate an extension of this, that amounts to Hall’s condition in
a certain graph. Let (A∪G,E) denote the bipartite graph where the two classes A and G represent
the agents and goods, respectively. We add an edge (i, j) ∈ E if ∂jui(0) > 0, that is, if agent i
is interested in good j. For a subset S ⊆ A, we let Γ(S) ⊆ G denote the set of neighbors in this
graph. Then, Hall’s condition, that is,∑
i∈S
bi ≤
∑
j∈Γ(S)
tj , ∀S ⊆ A (6)
is a necessary condition on the existence of an SR-equilibrium. Note however that this condition is
not sufficient: it holds for the example of Cobb-Douglas utilities, where no SR-equilibrium exists,
as explained after Definition 4.2.
Upper bounds on the prices We now give a bound on pSRmax in terms of Vmax and tmax. We
first consider the case when every agent is interested in every good. In this case, (6) reduces to
the case when S contains all goods. Note that the bounds are finite only if vimin > 0, and vimax is
finite. For the Cobb-Douglas utilities, vimax =∞.
Lemma 5.6. Assume the demand systems of the agents are given in the form (1) for monotone
concave and differentiable utility functions ui.
(i) Suppose that every agent is interested in every good, that is, ∂jui(0) > 0 for every agent i and
every good j. Assume that
∑
i bi ≤
∑
j tj. Then, the prices throughout the auction algorithm
remain bounded by (1 + ǫ)2tmaxVmax.
(ii) Assume condition (6) holds with strict inequality for all S ⊆ B. Then, the prices throughout
the auction algorithm remain bounded by (1 + ǫ)ntmaxV
n−1
max .
The same bounds are valid for any ǫ-SR equilibrium.
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Proof. Let us first consider (i). Let p denote the market prices at a certain point of the algorithm,
or at an ǫ-SR equilibrium, and let pSRmin be the minimal price among those. Observe that this
might be different from pmin, since pmin is the minimal price at the initialization. Let ℓ be the good
with pℓ = pSRmin.
We use the KKT conditions of the convex program (1). We let β(i) denote the Lagrange
multiplier of the budget constraint for agent i. Then, ∂jui(x
(i)) ≤ β(i)p
(i)
j for all goods j; and
equality holds whenever x
(i)
j > 0. Recall that each good j is owned by some agent during the
algorithm as well as in an ǫ-SR-equilibrium.
Consider a good j, and let k be an agent buying j, i.e., c
(k)
j > 0 and therefore x
(k)
j > 0. By the
above, p
(k)
j /p
(k)
ℓ ≤ ∂juk(x
(k))/∂ℓuk(x
(k)). The assumption that every agent is interested in every
good means that vimin = minj ∂jui(D · 1). Since x
(ℓ) ≤ D · 1, concavity implies ∂ℓuk(x
(k)) ≥ vimin.
We also get ∂juk(x
(k)) ≤ vkmax. Consequently, p
(k)
j /p
(k)
l ≤ vkmax/vkmin ≤ Vmax. Finally, since
p ≤ p(k) ≤ (1 + ǫ)p we have pj ≤ (1 + ǫ)pSRminVmax for any good j.
The proof is complete by showing that pSRmin ≤ (1 + ǫ)tmax. To prove this, we first show that
once p ≥ t, the algorithm terminates. Indeed, if p ≥ t, then the agents spend
∑
j tj in total, since
the amount aj = min{1, tj/pj} is always fully sold. The condition
∑
i bi ≤
∑
j tj shows that agents
cannot have any surplus at this point. Thus, once the lowest price rises above tmax, the algorithm
terminates. Since the prices increase in steps of (1 + ǫ), we get that pSRmin ≤ (1 + ǫ)tmax.
Let us now consider part (ii). We take the bipartite graph (A ∪ G,E), and on the same set of
nodes we define a directed graph as follows. We orient all edges in E from A to G, and also add
the arc (j, i) whenever x
(i)
j > 0. Fix any good j, and let S be the set of agents in A reachable from
j in this directed graph. Note that the set of goods reachable from j will be precisely Γ(S). Let
ℓ ∈ Γ(S) be the good with the lowest price pℓ. As above, we can show that pℓ ≤ (1 + ǫ)tmax, since
p ≥ t is not possible. Indeed, once p ≥ t, then all the available amounts of goods in Γ(S) are fully
sold, and their total value is
∑
j∈Γ(S) tj >
∑
i∈S bi by the assumption. By the definition of S, no
agent outside S pays for goods in Γ(S), leading to a contradiction.
The directed graph contains a path of length ≤ 2(n− 1) from pj to pℓ. As in the proof of part
(i), one can argue that for any two consecutive goods j′ and j′′ on this path, pj′/pj′′ ≤ (1+ ǫ)Vmax.
This implies the bound.
Bounding the prices for Gale demand systems Consider now the demand system Gui(p, bi)
defined from a monotone concave utility function by (4). An important difference is that agent
i may not exhaust their full budget bi; however, the concavity implies that they will never spend
more than bi in the optimal bundle. Consequently, even
∑
i bi ≤
∑
j tj is not a necessary condition
for the existence of an equilibrium.
Still, we can obtain the same bounds as in Lemma 5.6 on the prices. The proof is identical,
noting that the KKT conditions for (4) also imply p
(k)
j /p
(k)
ℓ ≤ ∂juk(x
(k))/∂ℓuk(x
(k)) if x
(k)
j > 0,
and the fact that agent i spends at most bi in their optimal bundle.
Lemma 5.7. Assume every agent has a Gale demand system (4) for monotone concave and dif-
ferentiable utility functions ui.
(i) Suppose that every agent is interested in every good, that is, ∂jui(0) > 0 for every agent i and
every good j. Assume that
∑
i bi ≤
∑
j tj. Then, the prices throughout the auction algorithm
remain bounded by (1 + ǫ)2tmaxVmax.
(ii) Assume condition (6) holds with strict inequality for all S ⊆ B. Then, the prices throughout
the auction algorithm remain bounded by (1 + ǫ)ntmaxV
n−1
max .
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The same bounds are valid for any ǫ-SR equilibrium.
6 Implementing FindNewPrices for Gale demand systems
We now show that the subroutine FindNewPrices can be implemented for Gale demand systems
via convex programming. As previously noted, this result is also applicable for demand systems
given in the form (1) for utility functions that are homogeneous of degree one, for which the optimal
solutions to (1) and (4) coincide.
Let u : Rm+ → R+ be a monotone concave differentiable function. Let us further assume that u
is strictly concave, and therefore we have unique demands: |Gu(p, b)| = 1 for all (p, b) ∈ Rm+ .
We show that a stronger version of the subroutine can be implemented, replacing the condition
yj > (1 + ǫ)cj by yj > cj in (B). We formulate the problem in a slightly more general form where
the vector of higher prices (1 + ǫ)p is replaced by an arbitrary price vector q.
Let p, q, c ∈ Rm+ and x ∈ G
u(p, b) such that p ≤ q and c ≤ x. The goal is to find p˜ and y such
that
(A’) y ≥ c where y ∈ Gu(p˜, b), and
(B’) p ≤ p˜ ≤ q and p˜j = qj whenever yj > cj .
The following convex program captures the idea that an agent is allowed to buy a good j at
two prices: amount y′j at price pj and amount y
′′
j at price qj. Moreover, the amount cj of good j
is offered at price pj and for the rest an agent pays the higher price qj.
5
max b lnu(y)− p⊤y′ − q⊤y′′
y = y′ + y′′
y′ ≤ c
y′, y′′ ≥ 0 .
(7)
We show that the optimal solution to this program, along with the prices obtained from the
KKT conditions satisfy the requirements.
Since all constraints are linear, strong duality holds. Let y∗ = y′ + y′′ be an optimal solution
of (7). Then, by the KKT conditions, there exists α ∈ Rm+ such that for any j ∈ [m],
(i) b ·
∂ju(y
∗)
u(y∗) ≤ min{αj + pj, qj},
(ii) b ·
∂ju(y
∗)
u(y∗) = αj + pj whenever y
′
j > 0,
(iii) b ·
∂ju(y
∗)
u(y∗) = qj whenever y
′′
j > 0, and
(iv) y′j = cj whenever αj > 0.
Let us define p˜j := αj + pj.
Lemma 6.1. The allocations y∗ and prices p˜ satisfy (A’) and (B’).
5Trivially, if pj < qj and y
′ < cj then y
′′
j = 0 in any optimal solution. For the goods where pj = qj we assume
that y′j < cj implies y
′′
j = 0, i.e., we always give priority to y
′
j .
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Figure 1: Agent i’s utility for good j.
Proof. Since all constraints are linear, strong duality holds for (4) as well as for (7). Let us start
with (B’). First note that (ii) implies that p˜j = qj whenever y
∗
j > cj . Moreover, from (i), (ii), and
(iv) it follows that p˜j ≤ qj.
For (A’), let us start by showing y∗ ∈ Gu(p˜, b). By the KKT conditions this is equivalent to
that
b∂ju(y∗)
u(y∗) ≤ p˜j and equality holds whenever y
∗
j > 0. This is immediate from (i), (ii), and the
definition of p˜j.
It remains to show that y∗ ≥ c. We prove by contradiction: assume that y∗j < cj for a good
j. This implies y′′j = 0 and αj = 0 by the optimality conditions, yielding p˜j = pj. By the strict
concavity assumption, y∗ is the unique optimal bundle in Gu(p˜, b). Using the WGS property for
(p, b) and (p˜, b) we have y∗j ≥ xj since pj = p˜j. We obtain a contradiction to y
∗
j < cj ≤ xj.
7 Approximating Nash social welfare
As an application of the spending restricted auction algorithm in Section 5, we give a polynomial-
time (2e1/2e + ǫ) ≈ 2.404-approximation algorithm for the NSW problem under budget-additive
separable piecewise linear concave (SPLC) utilities—the common generalization of the models in
[2] and [38]. We consider an instance of the NSW problem with n agents and m goods, in which we
have Dj units (copies) of good j. Each agent i has a budget-additive SPLC utility function defined
as follows (see Figure 1). For every good j, agent i has kij segments with strictly decreasing utility
rates uij1 > uij2 > . . . > uijkij ≥ 0. Segment t ∈ [kij ] has length dijt and agent i values at uijt each
of the units in the segment. We assume that
∑
t∈[kij ]
dijt = Dj . Furthermore, agent i’s utility is
capped at Ui, i.e., their utility is the minimum of Ui and the sum of the utilities accumulated from
the goods.
Chaudhury et al. [17] gave a e1/(1+ǫ)e ≈ 1.44-approximation algorithm for the problem, while
Anari et al. [2] studied the problem with SPLC utilities (Ui = ∞) and gave a 2-approximation
algorithm. The running times of these algorithms depend linearly on M , where M =
∑
j∈[m]Dj .
In other words, [2] and [17] use segments of length 1. Therefore, when multiple copies of a good have
the same utility rate, their algorithms run in pseudopolynomial time. Using the auction algorithm,
we give an approximation algorithm running in polynomial time: the utility function is specified
by the utility rate and the length of a segment rather than dijt segments of length one with the
same utility. The approach consists of three parts:
• Finding an SR-equilibrium for the instance of Fisher market arising as a relaxation of the NSW
problem. As already mentioned in the introduction, the natural relaxation of the NSW problem
requires the SR-equilibrium with respect to the Gale demand system, where each agent has
budget 1. We use the auction algorithm to find such an approximate SR-equilibrium (x, p). It is
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worth pointing out that this is the main reason why we obtain a better running time guarantee
than the existing approaches.
• Upper bound on the optimal value of the NSW in terms of prices p.
• Rounding the allocation x.
The last two rely on the ideas originally given by Cole and Gkatzelis [28] and extended in [2, 38].
More precisely, for the upper bound we follow [2] and we explain how the rounding reduces to
the case of budget-additive linear utilities [38]. For the sake of simplicity, we present an upper
bound and the rounding for an exact SR-equilibrium similarly as in [38]. The modification to
an approximate SR-equilibrium is straightforward. For the upper bound and rounding we make
the assumption that uijt ≤ Ui, as we could redefine the utilities to uijt ← min{uijt, Ui} without
changing the objective value of the feasible allocations for the NSW instance.
7.1 SR equilibrium under Gale demand systems of a budget-additive SPLC
We now consider the Gale demand system for budget-additive SPLC. We first show that the cor-
responding demand system is WGS—thus we can use the auction algorithm; and then we give an
implementation of the FindNewPrices subroutine for this demand system. Note that the convex
programming approach does not immediately apply, since the utility function is not differentiable,
and the optimal bundle is not unique. Instead, we give a simple price increment procedure, an
extension of that in Lemma 3.8 for linear utilities. As both the WGS property and FindNewPrices
refer to a fixed agent, we drop the term i denoting the agent in the subscripts.
The Gale demand system Gu(p, b) is defined as the set of optimal solutions to the following
formulation.
max b log

∑
j
∑
t
xjtujt

−∑
j
pj
kj∑
t=1
xjt
s.t. xjt ≤ djt ∀j ∈ [m], t ∈ [kj ]
m∑
j=1
kj∑
t=1
xjtujt ≤ U
x ≥ 0 .
(8)
It can be easily verified, using the KKT conditions given below, that admissible spendings in [2]
correspond to the case when U = ∞, and modest and thrifty demand bundles in [38] to the case
when kj = 1 for all j with dj1 =∞.
Let us now present the KKT conditions characterizing the optimal solution x∗. Let rjt be
the Lagrange multipliers of the constraint xjt ≤ djt and γ the Lagrange multiplier of the utility
constraint. Recall that u(x∗) =
∑
j
∑
t ujtx
∗
jt. We have the following:
(i)
bujt
u(x∗) ≤ rjt + pj + ujtγ,
(ii)
bujt
u(x∗) = rjt + pj + ujtγ whenever x
∗
jt > 0,
(iii) x∗jt = djt whenever rjt > 0, and
(iv)
∑
j
∑
t x
∗
jtujt = U whenever γ > 0.
Lemma 7.1 (WGS property). The Gale demand system for budget-additive SPLC utilities satisfies
the WGS property.
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Proof. Let us consider prices p′ defined as p′j = pj for j ∈ [m] \ {ℓ} and p
′
ℓ > pℓ. We show that
there is an optimal bundle x′ at prices p′ such that x′jt ≥ x
∗
jt for all j 6= ℓ and all t ∈ [kj ]. For
prices p′, let u be the optimal utility in (8) and let γ′ be the Lagrange multiplier of constraint on
the maximum utility achieved. We consider two cases.
Case 1: u¯ < u(x∗i ). By (ii), x
∗
jt > 0 implies
ujt
pj
≥ u(x
∗)
b . Thus, we have
ujt
p′j
=
ujt
pj
≥
u(x∗i )
b >
u
b
for all j, t with x∗jt > 0 and j 6= ℓ.
Moreover, by (ii) and (iii), if
ujt
p′j
> ub ·
(
1 + γ′ ·
ujt
p′j
)
then x′jt = djt. By (iv), u¯ < u(x
∗
i ) ≤ U
implies that γ′ = 0, and hence x′jt = djt for all j, t with x
∗
jt > 0 and j 6= ℓ. In other words, for every
item j, j 6= ℓ, every segment of the good that the agent was buying at prices p is fully bought at
prices p′. The lemma follows.
Case 2: u¯ = u(x∗i ). It suffices to prove that the optimal solutions of the following knapsack
linear program satisfy the WGS property.
min
∑
j
pj
kj∑
t=1
xjt
s.t. xjt ≤ djt ∀j ∈ [m], t ∈ [kj ]
m∑
j=1
kj∑
t=1
xjtujt = u¯
x ≥ 0 .
(9)
Suppose that the optimal solution x is unique, then it can be build in a greedy fashion. Order the
segments of all items in a decreasing order of the fractions
ujt
pj
. Then x is obtained by purchasing
the segments (i.e. allocating xjt = djt) in the above order until the utility becomes u¯; having in
mind that the last purchased segment might be purchased only partially.
To prove the WGS property we consider increasing price pℓ of an item ℓ. The price increase will
cause the segments corresponding to good ℓ to move further back in the ordering while the relative
order of all rest of the segments remains unchanged. Hence, by the greedy argument above, one
can find an optimal solution x′ with x′jt ≥ xjt for all j 6= ℓ and t ∈ [kj ].
In the case there are multiple optimal solutions, a similar argument holds since two optimal
solution differ only on a set of goods with the same ratio
ujt
pj
.
As in Section 6, we show that the following slightly more general version of FindNewPrices can
be implemented. Let p, q, c ∈ Rm+ and x ∈ G
u(p, b) such that p ≤ q and c ≤ x. Find p˜ and y such
that
(A’) y ≥ c where y ∈ Gu(p˜, b), and
(B’) p ≤ p˜ ≤ q and p˜j = qj whenever yj > cj .
Lemma 7.2 (FindNewPrices). The procedure FindNewPrices can be implemented in time O(K)
for Gale demand systems with budget-additive SPLC utilities, where K =
∑
j∈[m] kj is the number
of segments with different marginal utility.
The proof is via an algorithm that is an extension of the one in the proof of Lemma 3.8 for
linear utilities.
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Proof. We present an algorithm for finding such prices p˜ and bundle y. The algorithm initializes
p˜ = p and y = c. The prices as well as the allocations are non-decreasing throughout the algorithm.
Note that u(y) < U at the initialization; otherwise, c = x would follow and we can simply output
y = x and p˜ = p. We maintain p ≤ p˜ ≤ q throughout. For each j ∈ [m], let tj ∈ [kj ] denote the
first segment of a good j that is not completely sold in y, i.e., the minimal tj such that yjtj < djtj .
We call this the active segment for j.
Consider the optimal bundle x such that c ≤ x, and let γ be the Lagrange multiplier for the
utility cap constraint for x. We initialize β = (b/u(x)− γ)−1. Then, from (i)-(iii) we see that if
xjt = 0 then ujt/pj ≤ β, if 0 < xjt < djt then ujt/pj = β, and if xjt = djt then ujt/pj ≥ β.
Stage I: enforcing the complementary conditions The algorithm proceeds in two stages.
In the first stage, we consider the goods for which ujtj/p˜j > β yet yjtj < djt. (Recall that we
initialized y = c and p˜ = p.) For each such good, we increase p˜j until either ujtj/p˜j = β, or p˜j = qj.
In the latter case, we buy the entire active segment of j, that is, we increase to yjtj = djtj . Thus,
tj increases by 1. If we still have ujtj/qj > β, we again buy the entire active segment, and continue
until ujtj/qj ≤ β for the current active segment. This finishes the description of the first stage.
From the optimality conditions on x, it is easy to see that y ≤ x at the end of the first stage.
We claim that the following conditions are satisfied at this point:
yjt = 0⇒ ujt/p˜j ≤ β, 0 < yjt < djt ⇒ ujt/p˜j = β, yjt = djt ⇒ ujt/p˜j ≥ β. (10)
u(y) ≤ min{U, bβ} (11)
yjt > cjt ⇒ p˜j = qj (12)
The conditions (10) and (12) are immediate from the algorithm. The bound (11) follows since
y ≤ x; u(y) ≤ u(x) ≤ U by the feasibility of x and u(x) ≤ bβ by the definition of β.
Stage II: price increases In the second stage we continue increasing y and p˜, as well as de-
creasing β so that (10), (11), and (12) are maintained. The algorithm terminates once (11) holds
at equality. In this case, one can verify from the optimality conditions that y ∈ Gu(p˜, b). Together
with (12), we see that the output satisfies (A’) and (B’).
The algorithm performs the following iterations. We let A denote the set of goods for which
ujtj/p˜j = β. If there is a good j ∈ A with p˜j = qj, then we start increasing yjtj until either
1. yjtj = djtj . Note that tj increases by one in this case, and j leaves A.
2. The inequality (11) becomes binding. In this case, the algorithm terminates.
We now turn to the case when p˜j < qj for all j ∈ A. During the iteration we multiplicatively
increase the price of every good in A by the same factor α > 0, as well as decrease β by the factor
α. We choose the smallest value of α when one of the following events happen:
1. For some j ∈ A we reach p˜j = qj. We change the allocations as described above.
2. The inequality (11) becomes binding (due to the decrease in β). In this case, the algorithm
terminates.
3. For some good ℓ /∈ A,
uℓtℓ
pℓ
= β. In this case, we add ℓ to A, and iterate with the larger set.
It is easy to see that all three properties (10), (11), and (12) are maintained throughout the
algorithm. We claim that the number of price change steps is at most
∑
j kj . Indeed, a price
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increase step always ends when a good j with p˜j = qj enters A, either in case 1 or case 3. Once this
happens, we increase yjtj ; if the algorithm does not terminate, then we saturate the segment to
yjtj = dj . This shows that the number of price augmentation steps is bounded by the total number
of segments
∑
j kj.
Bound on pSRmax While the budget-additive SPLC utilities are not strictly monotone nor
differentiable, the same bound as in Lemma 5.6 (or Lemma 5.7) can be similarly proved for
vimax = maxj∈[m],t∈[kij] uijt and vimin = minj∈[m],t∈[kij]{uijt : uijt > 0}. The value uijt represent
the utility rate of agent i for the t-th segment of item j.
Recall that Dj is the number of units available of good j, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 7.3. Consider the Fisher market instance arising from the NSW problem where agents
have budget-additive SPLC utilities. Let K = maxi∈A
∑
j∈G kij be the minimum number of segments
needed to specify the utility of any agent. We can find an ǫ-SR equilibrium with respect to the Gale
demand systems and bounds tj := Dj in time O
(
n3mK
ǫ2
log
(
DmaxVmax
ǫ
))
.
Proof. We start by adding a dummy agent 0 to the market with budget ǫ. The utility of agent 0 is
additive, meaning that for each good j, there is only one segment of length Dj and u0,j,1 = 1. We
initialize the auction algorithm by setting each price pj to
ǫ∑
j Dj
and assigning all goods to 0. By
running the auction algorithm for SR-equilibrium we obtain 4ǫ5 -approximate equilibrium. Now, we
can remove the agent. As this agent could be buying the goods in amount at most ǫ, by removing
the dummy agent we are left with a slightly weaker notion of ǫ-approximate equilibrium. Namely,
the first an third condition in the definition of approximate equilibrium 4.2 are satisfied by the
choice of the precision parameter, but the second condition is not satisfied exactly. Rather, we can
only guarantee that
∑n
i=1 x
(i)
j ≤ aj and
∑
j∈[m] pj(aj −
∑n
i=1 x
(i)
j ) ≤ ǫ. In words, the total price of
unsold available amounts of all goods is ǫ.
By Theorem 5.2 the auction algorithm runs in O
(
nmTF
ǫ2
log
(
pSRmax
pmin
))
. Recall that TF
is time needed to implement FindNewPrices. By Lemma 7.2, in this case TF is O(K). By
construction, pmin =
ǫ∑
j Dj
. By Lemma 5.6 and/or Lemma 5.7 we have that pSRmax ≤ (1 +
ǫ)nDmaxV
n−1
max .
7.2 Upper bound on the optimal NSW value
Let (x, p) an SR-equilibrium in the Fisher market arising from an instance of NSW (with respect to
the Gale demand system) and with bounds (Dj)j∈[m]. In other words, we have that xi ∈ G
ui(p, 1)
for each agent i ∈ A and for all j ∈ G it holds
∑
i∈[n] xij =
∑
i∈[n],j∈[m],t∈[kij]
xijt = Dj ·min{1, 1/pj}.
As xi ∈ G
ui(p, 1) we have the following KKT conditions, see Section 7.1:
(i)
uijt
ui(xi)
≤ rijt + pj + uijtγi,
(ii)
uijt
ui(xi)
= rijt + pj + uijtγi whenever xijt > 0,
(iii) xijt = dijt whenever rijt > 0, and
(iv)
∑
j
∑
t xijtuijt = Ui whenever γi > 0.
Let us describe some properties of SR-equilibrium (x, p) that the above KKT condition imply.
By the second property we have that
uijt
rijt+pj
= ui(xi)1−γiui(xi) whenever xijt > 0. This justifies defining
mbbi :=
ui(xi)
1−γiui(xi)
. Since the SR-equilibrium as well as NSW are invariant under scaling each
agents utilities uijt and Ui, we assume that mbbi = 1 for all agents i. (This implies an appropriate
implicit scaling of each γi as well.) By the previous assumption and the third condition we obtain:
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Proposition 7.4. If xijt > 0 then
uijt
pj
≥ 1. If
uijt
pj
> mbbi = 1 then xijt = dijt.
In other words, an agent only buys copies of good with utility at least as much as the price, and
if agent values some copy of a good strictly more than its price then she also gets this copy in x.
We say that an agent i is capped if ui(xi) = Ui and non-capped otherwise. Denote with
H(p) = {j ∈ [m] : pj > 1} the set of expensive goods.
Proposition 7.5. Aˇssume mbbi = 1 for all agents i. For all capped agents i we have that xijt = 0
for all j ∈ H(p) and all t ∈ [kij ], and ui(x) = Ui ≤ 1. Each non-capped agent i receives exactly one
unit of utility ui(x) = 1.
Proof. Suppose not and let xijt > 0 for some j ∈ H(p). Then uijt ≥ pj > 1. Since Ui ≥ uijt it also
holds that Ui > 1. A contradiction as 1 <
Ui
1−γiui(xi)
= ui(xi)1−γiui(xi) = 1.
Since ui(xi)1−γiui(xi) = 1 and γiui(xi) ≥ 0 it follows that ui(xi) ≤ 1. The fourth KKT condition
implies that that γi = 0 for non-capped agents.
In order to prove the upper bound we may assume that Ui = ∞ for all non-capped agents.
Such an assumption can only increase the optimal NSW, so if we prove the upper bound under
the assumption it also holds in the original instance. Since “cap inequality” is ineffective for every
non-capped agent, by the KKT condition we can see that (x, p) remains being an SR-equilibrium.
Denote with Ac (resp. Au) the set of capped (resp. non-capped) agents in the equilibrium (x, p).
Lemma 7.6. Let p be an SR-equilibrium prices and x∗ an optimal NSW allocation. Then
NSW(x∗) ≤

∏
i∈Ac
Ui ·
∏
j∈H(p)
p
Dj
j


1/n
.
Proof. First we give a bound on the sum of the agents’ utility in any integer allocation z as a
function of prices p. Recall that x is an SR-equilibrium allocation for prices p. Since valuations of
the agents are scaled as to mbbi = 1, by Proposition 7.5 each non-capped agent receives exactly 1
unit of utility in x. Each capped agent receives Ui utility in x by definition. However, if there are
some expensive goods than x does not fully allocate all goods. Each copy of the expensive goods
generates 1 unit of utility in x since the total spending on it is precisely 1 and since no capped
agent buys expensive goods (Proposition 7.5).
Let x¯ be the allocation in which we allocate every copy of each expensive good j to a single
agent spending on it in x. We can do so since the spending is exactly Dj and thus, there are at least
as many agents buying good j as the copies. As all of these agents are non-capped and we assume
that for such agents Ui = ∞, it follows that each copy of an expensive item generates exactly pj
utility to the agents in x¯. By Proposition 7.4, it is at least pj as xijt > 0 implies that uijt ≥ pj ; it
is at most pj by the contraposition of: uijt > pj implies that xijt = dijt ≥ 1. Therefore, the total
utility that all the items generate in x¯ is:∑
i∈Ac
Ui + |Au|+
∑
j∈H(p)
Dj(pj − 1) =
∑
i∈Ac
Ui + |Au| −
∑
j∈H(p)
Dj +
∑
j∈H(p)
Djpj .
We claim that the total utility of all the agents in any integer allocation is not larger than the
above sum. Consider the copies of item j. In x¯, each one of those items generates either pj or more
than pj utility. Moreover, any agent that can derive more than pj utility from a copy of a good
actually receives the copy in x¯. Therefore, x¯ allocates the copy of goods to the agents such that
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the total utility all the goods generate is maximized. It follows that for any integral allocation z
the total utility all agents receive is at most∑
i∈[n]
ui(z) ≤
∑
i∈Ac
Ui + |Au| −
∑
j∈H(p)
Dj +
∑
j∈H(p)
Djpj .
At this point, suppose that we are given the above amount of utility and we can freely distribute
it among agents to maximize NSW, regardless of what the utility function of each agent is, but
only respecting the fact that the capped agents cannot get more than their cap, and that expensive
goods are indivisible. By Proposition 7.5, all caps of the capped agents are at most 1. Then, it is
not too hard to see that the optimal way of distributing our lump sum of utility is to assign: each
expensive copy to an non-capped agent and nothing else to those agents, exactly Ui to each capped
agent, and 1 to everyone else. In this case, the NSW is exactly
(∏
i∈Ac
Ui ·
∏
j∈H(p) p
Dj
j
)1/n
.
7.3 Rounding
As in the previous section, we assume that the utilities are scaled such that mbbi = 1. Moreover,
we use that uijt ≤ Ui. We reduce our rounding to the case of budget-additive linear utilities in [38].
It is convenient to present the rounding in terms of the spending graph. For an SR-equilibrium
(x, p) the spending graph is a bipartite graph (A,G;E) where an agent i is adjacent to a good j if
and only if xij > 0. We show how to round x to an integral allocation x
′.
By KKT conditions, whenever
uijt
pj
> mbbi then xijt = dijt – in this case we allocate dijt copies
of good j to i by setting x′ijt ← dijt. Moreover, if for for some triple i, j, t it holds xijt > 1 we
allocate ⌊xijt⌋ units of good j to agent i. Formally, we set x
′
ijt ← ⌊xijt⌋. Once we do the previous
for all goods and all agents, any agent can have at most up to one unit of a good that she is buying
in the SR-equilibrium but that is not yet allocated in x′. Hence, there are at most n units of each
good j that are still to be allocated. By the first rule for allocating goods, for these remaining
copies of a good j, if an agent i is buying a fraction of it holds
uijti
pj
= 1 (where ti is the first
non-saturated segment of agent i). By assuming that uijt = 0 for all t > ti, we can transform the
instance into an instance instance in which the utility of every agent is budget-additive linear. The
only issue is that we could have several copies of a good. Since there are at most n copies of each
good that are unassigned and the utilities are budget additive linear, we can simply split each good
into the appropriate number of goods with a single copy. Then, the rest of the rounding follows
the exact same steps as the rounding for budget additive linear utilities [38]. The analysis reduces
in the same way. By choosing a suitable ǫ we obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 7.7. Consider an instance of NSW problem where agents has budget additive SPLC
utilities. Let K = maxi∈A
∑
j∈G kij be the minimum number of segments needed to specify the
utility of any agent. Then there is an algorithm running in time O
(
n3mK log (DmaxVmax)
)
and
produces a solution that is at most 2.404 times worse than the optimum.
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A Missing proof from Section 2
Lemma 2.6. The CES demand system with parameter σ > 1 has elasticity at least −σ, and the
Cobb-Douglas demand system has elasticity at least −1.
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Proof. Using the form of CES utilities described above, the demand at prices p is xj =
βjp
−σ
j b∑
k βkp
1−σ
k
.
Fix a good j. Denote with x′ the optimal bundle where we increase the price of good j by factor
(1 + µ). Since CES satisfies the WGS property for σ > 1, we have
x′j =
βj(1 + µ)
−σp−σj b∑
k 6=j βkp
1−σ
k + βj(1 + µ)
1−σp1−σk
=
βjp
−σ
j b
(1 + µ)σ
∑
k 6=j βkp
1−σ
k + βj(1 + µ)p
1−σ
k
>
βjp
−σ
j b
(1 + µ)σ
∑
k βkp
1−σ
k
=
1
(1 + µ)σ
xj .
For Cobb-Douglas utility function is given by u(x) =
∏
j x
αj
j where
∑
j αj = 1, α ≥ 0, the
optimal bundle is xj = bαj/pj. Hence, increasing the price of a good by some factor leads to the
decrease in demand for that good by the same factor.
B Exchange markets
B.1 Running times of existing auction algorithms
We review the running time bounds given in previous auction algorithms and compare them to our
bounds.
Linear utility functions [42] The paper includes two algorithms. The running times are
O
(
nm
ǫ2
· log
(
pmax1⊤e
ǫpminemin
)
· log
(
pmax
pmin
))
and O
(
nm
ǫ (n+m) log
(
pmax
pmin
))
, respectively. The running
time in Theorem 3.1, with the bound TF = O(m) for linear utilities from Lemma 3.8, gives an
additional factor m when compared to the first bound. The first log factor is removed, however,
we obtain a weaker equilibrium notion. The additional factor is due to our global update step: due
to the more general, nonseparable nature of our framework, we consider all goods when updating
an agent, while [42] considers only one good for an update.
The paper also gives the price bound pmaxpmin ≤ (1 + ǫ)
vmax
vmin
, where vmax = maxi,j vi,j and vmin =
mini,j vi,j are the highest utility and the lowest utility and agent has for a good, as well as a more
general bound for the case when vmin = 0 is possible. These bounds are comparable to our bounds
in Section 5.2 for SR-equilibria.
Separable WGS [45] The running time bound is presented only for the Fisher market case,
given as O
(
nm
ǫ
log
1
ǫ
log
vmax1
⊤b
bminvmin
logm
)
. Here, vmax := maxi vimax and vmin := mini vimin are
upper and lower bounds on the slopes of the functions (analogous to those we define in (5)), bmin
is the smallest budget, and v is the total utility an agent would get from owning the full amount
of all goods. An issue with such a bound is that the value vmaxvmin is not scale invariant. Namely, the
equilibrium in Fisher market remains the same even if each agent i multiplies their utility function
by a positive constant αi; but this changes the value
vmax
vmin
arbitrarily. It is mentioned that the result
could be extended to exchange markets, similarly to [42], but no details or running time estimation
are provided.
Uniformly separable WGS [44] The paper gives essentially the same bound as in the case of
separable WGS; the analysis is limited and mainly refers to [45]. A problematic issue is that the
main motivation for the paper is to give bounds on CES and Cobb-Douglas utilities, but vmax =∞
for these particular utilities.
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B.2 Adding a dummy agent to bound the prices
We can use the same idea as [23, 25]. Given an exchange market M with agents A and goods G,
we transform it to another market Mˆ with n+ 1 agents as follows. Let η ≤ 1 be a parameter such
that η1+η > ǫ(1 + ǫ)m (and ǫ(1 + ǫ)m ≤ 1/2). For i ∈ A we keep the same demand systems Di and
the same initial endowments e(i). The market Mˆ has an extra agent n+ 1 with initial endowment
e(n+1) = ηe and whose demand bundle is given via Cobb-Douglas utility function
(∏
j x
(n+1)
j
)1/m
.
Agent n+ 1 spends exactly 1m of the budget on any good j since its unique demand bundle x
(n+1)
is given by x
(n+1)
j =
ηp⊤e
mpj
.
The lemma below shows that adding such an agent can be used to bound pmaxpmin , at the expense
of working on an modified market.
Lemma B.1. (i) For an ǫ-equilibrium of Mˆ , formed by prices p and bundles x(i) we have
pmax
pmin
≤
(1 + ǫ)m
η − ǫm(1 + ǫ)(1 + η)
·
emax
emin
, where emax = maxj ej and emin = minj ej .
(ii) An ǫ-equilibrium in Mˆ gives an ǫ(1 + η)-equilibrium in M .
Proof. Consider an ǫ-equilibrium in Mˆ formed by p and bundles x(i). By definition, there exists
z(n+1) ∈ Dn+1
(
p(n+1), ηp⊤e
)
such that x(n+1) ≤ z(n+1) and p ≤ p(n+1) ≤ (1 + ǫ)p. We have
z
(n+1)
j =
ηp⊤e
mp
(n+1)
j
, and therefore, pjz
(n+1)
j ≥
η
(1+ǫ)mp
⊤e. On the other hand, from the third condition
of the definition of ǫ-equilibrium it follows that pj(z
(n+1)
j −x
(n+1)
j ) ≤ ǫp
⊤e(1+η). Hence, pjx
(n+1)
j ≥(
η
(1+ǫ)m − ǫ(1 + η)
)
p⊤e for all j. In particular, x
(n+1)
j ≥
(
η
(1+ǫ)m − ǫ(1 + η)
)
pmaxemin
pj
for all j.
Since x
(n+1)
j ≤ ej ≤ emax in an ǫ-equilibrium, we have
pmax
pmin
≤
(
η
(1 + ǫ)m
− ǫ(1 + η)
)−1 emax
emin
.
The second part of the lemma follows easily from the definition of an approximate equilibrium.
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